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Introduction 
This paper treats the question of the Internet and its influence on conventional theories of 
lone wolf terrorism. I argue that increasing use of the Internet by terrorists makes it more 
difficult to determine whether or not individuals are truly lone wolves. I apply this hypothesis to 
the complicated French case study of Mohamed Merah, whose lone wolf status is still disputed 
even a year after his attacks. This paper finds that the influence of the Internet has contaminated 
the traditional idea of a pure lone wolf, and thus multiple concepts must be defined to address the 
spectrum of behavior of lone individuals. I forward the terms “lone wolf” and “lone actor” to 
achieve this aim. These terms are then applied to the French case of Mohamed Merah, a complex 
case rife with misinformation and contradictory testimonies. This research is especially pertinent 
in the wake of the Boston marathon bombings, suspected at this writing to have been perpetrated 
by the Tsarnaev brothers who self-radicalized and may have acted alone. Fittingly, I conclude 
this paper with a brief discussion of this case and overarching theoretical and policy implications 
for both France and the United States.  
 
This research evolved since my sophomore year, when my original CISLA research 
proposal suggested study of the French counterterrorism policies against homegrown terrorism. 
Courses taken at Connecticut College – including GOV 494B Countering Terrorism and 
Insurgency, REL 304 Fundamentalisms, FRH 422 Black Blanc Beur and an independent study 
(FRH 491) in the French department – as well as courses taken while abroad at Sciences Po Paris 
– including War and Peace in the Global Village and Transnational Islam in Europe – have 
greatly shaped the direction of this project since its inception. This research was augmented by 
my internship with the French Ministry of the Interior in the summer of 2012 and two weeks 
spent in Paris and Brussels in January 2013. For the latter trip, I was the recipient of a travel 
grant that funded additional scholarly research abroad. During the two week span I interviewed 
Claude Moniquet: Director of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) 
in Brussels, Mathieu Guidère: professor at the University of Toulouse and author of the book Les 
Nouveaux Terroristes, Mohamed-Ali Adraoui: noted research scholar and expert on Salafism in 
France and professor at Sciences Po Paris, and finally Anne-Sophie Lamine: expert on religious 
plurality in France and professor at the University of Strasbourg.  
 
This research is pertinent because homegrown, lone wolf terrorism is increasingly a 
menacing threat on the radar of many Western countries. Marc Sageman (2008) notes that since 
9/11 there were over 2,300 arrests connected to Islamist terrorism in Europe compared to 60 in 
the United States.1 Ramon Spaaij (2012) claims that “the most marked increase” in lone wolf 
terrorism in recent decades was in Europe where he calculates attacks have quadrupled between 
the 1970s and 2000s.2 In 2011, the European Police Chiefs Convention estimated, “the changing 
dynamics in our societies, together with technological advances, may encourage isolated, 
disaffected individuals to turn into violent extremists, to the extreme of becoming “lone wolf” 
terrorists.” 3  These figures suggest that something in the global security environment has 
changed, and it is imperative that governments understand the threat in order to create effective 
policy responses.  
 
For many countries, especially the United States, the focus must now turn away from Al 
Qaeda. Al Qaeda no longer plays a major role on the current security landscape. Many training 
camps were destroyed and central members killed in the aftermath of September 11 and as a 
result, Al Qaeda began advocating individual resistance in 2011. In a video in early June of 
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2011, the group said, “Muslims in the West have to remember that they are perfectly placed [to 
commit attacks].”4 Scholars disagree over whether or not this change in tactic is admission of 
defeat or simply adaptation to the changing conditions under which Al Qaeda operatives 
function. However, Raffaello Pantucci (2011) argues that Al Qaeda’s strength has been in 
providing an ideology “with transnational appeal” which allows individuals to commit attacks of 
their own accord with only inspiration from Al Qaeda and its affiliates.5 Moreover, this tactical 
change has great potential for increasing the success of terrorism. Individual jihadists can easily 
confuse or remain entirely anonymous to intelligence services.6 Furthermore, liberated from the 
group structure, lone wolves have the freedom to be motivated by ideologies that combine 
personal frustrations and radical beliefs. 
 
The Internet is of increasing utility for terrorist recruitment and communication as well as 
attack purposes. One of the earliest attempts by a jihadist group to use the Internet for its 
purposes was Azzam.com in 1997.7 Interestingly, those who are commenting on online texts and 
videos about bomb making are mainly from the United Kingdom and the United States; only 
10% are consulting these sites from the Middle East and Muslim Africa.8 Individuals can consult 
terrorist propaganda online, but they can also interact with one another on chat forums, which 
creates a “replacement social environment” that facilitates lone radicalization.9 Terrorists can 
also make use of social networking sites like Facebook and LinkedIn in order to recruit and 
expedite attack planning. The ease with which individuals can connect across the world today is 
what allows leaderless strategies to not only work, but also to flourish.  
 
This research focuses on radicals of Muslim faith because this population is consistent 
with the major threat facing Europe, as well as the case study examined in the final section; this 
does not suggest, however, that any causal connections should be made between Islam and 
terrorism. The ummah – the Arabic term for community – has become increasingly important in 
this newest wave of globalization and serves as the umbrella under which Muslims across the 
world unite without distinction of origins or nationality.10 This transnational community can 
establish an identity for Muslims who may feel isolated in other societies where they are a 
minority. On the other hand, it also may create a dangerous environment where strong group 
solidarity leads individuals to seek revenge against entities who have somehow harmed the 
group. “Regardless of the absurdity of the violence, it is perceived as an adequate response to the 
injustices [felt by members of the Muslim community].” 11  Moreover, the transnational 
community makes it easy for lone wolves to operate alone while still being reinforced by a 
perceived community of like-minded individuals. While his research sample of lone wolves 
indicated Islamism motivated only 15%, Spaiij’s analysis deemed lone wolves of Muslim faith to 
be on the rise, which is why studying this portion of the population is of particular relevance.12  
 
 This paper will first provide a literature survey on root causes of radicalization and 
proceed to an exploration of terrorist use of the Internet, followed by discussion and 
development of lone wolf theories. I will use this information to examine the case study of 
Mohamed Merah in France. My final section will discuss my findings, suggestions for future 
research and implications for theory and policy. Notably, the implications of this research 
include a brief comparison with the recent Boston marathon bombings. Inclusion of this case 
serves to elevate my findings from the French context to the pertinent debate in America 
concerning self-radicalization and homegrown terrorism. 
Introduction 
 
Section Endnotes!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2008. Print. P. 90. 
2 Spaaij, R. F. J. Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention. Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2012. Print. 
3 Ibid., p. 2.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Pantucci, Raffaello. A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists. The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization. N.p., 5 Apr. 2011. Web. 
6 Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism. 
7 Amble, John C. "Combatting Terrorism in the New Media Environment." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35.5 
(2012): 339-53. Print. 
8 Guidère, Mathieu. Les Nouveaux Terroristes. Paris: Autrement, 2010. Print. 
9 Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism. 
10 Guidère, Mathieu. Personal interview. 7 January 2013. 
11 Guidère, Les Nouveaux Terroristes, p. 60. 
12 Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism. The database on terrorism upon which Spaaij’s analysis is based 
cited 17% of lone wolves were right wing and White supremacist extremists, 8% anti-abortion, 7% 
nationalism/separatism. The other half of the sample did not have an identified ideology. Spaaij’s database was 
made through an analysis of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge 
Base (TKB) 
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1. ROOT CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION 
 
When addressing radicalization, it is useful to derive not only the root causes that lead an 
individual to embark on the process of radicalization, but the process of radicalization itself. 
Understanding the causes and steps in the process helps to facilitate recommendations for 
counter-terrorism measures. I will begin this section with the findings of an analytic essay I 
wrote sophomore year for a seminar titled, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (GOV 494B), 
because it was this research that inspired my SIP. I will follow this with an overview of my 
research conducted last semester in an independent study in the French department, and finally I 
will incorporate theories I have explored this semester. 
 
Previous Research – Spring 2011 
 
In the spring semester of 2011, I analyzed Max Abrahms’ essay “What Terrorists Really 
Want” (2008). Abrahms puts forth the argument that individuals turn to terrorism not because of 
political ideology, rather a desire for social solidarity.1 Abrahms seeks to explain the role of 
social benefits both in recruitment of terrorists and in the actions of terrorist organizations. It is 
important to note here that he does not include analysis of lone wolves. However, his model is 
important for understanding radicalization and, like many other theories explored in this section, 
may have explanatory power when considering Internet communities and lone wolves.  
 
Abrahms argues that group dynamics constitute the sole motivation for individuals to join 
terrorist organizations. Abrahms’ theoretical causation defines the independent variable as the 
degree of social alienation in society (high or low) and the dependent variable as high or low 
motives for an individual to join a terrorist organization. The prime hypothesis is that a high 
level of alienation in society leads to high motives to join an organization, while low alienation, 
or inclusion in society, corresponds with low motivation to join an organization. Abrahms did 
not discuss condition variables or antecedent conditions, but I assumed in my paper that in order 
for the theory to work, social exclusion must exist in society and terrorist organizations must be 
willing to exploit that for recruitment purposes.  
 
In my own theory development in the spring of 2011, I suggested some condition 
variables of my own; these variables determined the level of isolation in society to further code 
Abrahms’ theory. First, I stated that the level of success in society would contribute to the degree 
of alienation primarily because higher success correlates with lower grievances, but also because 
the more successful an out-group is, the more they are included and respected by the in-group. 
Second, I claimed that government policy has a role to play in the feeling of isolation – if the 
government is not providing programs that promote inclusion, or if they pass laws that directly 
limit cultural and religious rights, the degree of social alienation increases. The third and final 
proposed condition variable concerned existing prejudices towards an out-group. For example, 
Western countries increasingly perceive Muslim immigrants as threats, especially in the wake of 
September 11, regardless of how baseless these fears are. This existing prejudice in the host 
country leads to a high degree of immigrant alienation. Many of my original ideas are echoed in 
the following theories of group radicalization, and a large number of them in turn resonate with 
Abrahms’ emphasis on the importance of social solidarity.  
 
Section One: Root Causes of Radicalization 
Amendments 
 
Two years have passed since I conducted the research above and it is clear that certain 
amendments should be made. First, concerning my variable on level of success in society, 
subsequent research shows that unemployment (a key indicator of failure) is not a determining 
factor in terrorist motivations. John Rosenthal (2006) argues that in fact, in a survey of inmates 
in France suspected to be Al Qaeda sympathizers, many held advanced degrees and were from 
privileged milieus.2 Marc Sageman (2008) argues similarly that the extent of college degree and 
employment varies over time; the most recent terrorists, for example, are the least educated and 
have the highest unemployment rates. Furthermore, Sageman argues that terrorists themselves 
are usually not poor; they tend to be motivated by the destitution of others in a phenomenon he 
calls “vicarious poverty.”3 His idea got me thinking. I posit, therefore, that unemployment and 
poverty lead to lower purchasing power, which has ramifications for identity. In many Western 
countries, the ability to consume is very important for identity. Therefore, if we assume that the 
unemployed and poor are isolated from the consumer society, we could conclude that this still 
impacts a feeling of isolation from an identity perspective.  
 
Concerning my second condition variable, I do believe government policy is still an 
important factor in the radicalization process, though it is categorized by the 2011 Transnational 
Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law paper (explained below) as an “external” factor and 
thus not very determinant.4 Furthermore, Claude Moniquet, director of the European Strategic 
Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), claimed that “[cultural laws are] a way of 
radicalization for some people. But these people would be radicalized anyway. It’s just an 
occasion, it’s just a pretext.”5 I would argue, however, that a country’s integration policy does 
have an influence on radicalization. Jonothan Laurence’s (2012) piece on integration in Europe is 
particularly interesting because he believes cultural laws and strict integration policies put 
moderate Muslims at risk for radicalization. 6  Typically, it is assumed that inequitable 
government policies act as catalyzers for individuals already considered to be radical. Laurence’s 
claim that moderate Muslims are actually catalyzed by such policies highlights the substantial 
influence that discriminatory policies can have on the radicalization process. Beyond domestic 
government policies, I didn’t consider in my original paper the idea that government foreign 
policy also may play a role in the creation of grievances. Mathieu Guidère, in a personal 
interview in January 2013, said that he believes many individuals turn violent because of 
identification with external factors.7  For example, the perceived favoritism of Israel over 
Palestine in France’s foreign policy doctrine may resonate in the minds of Muslims who identify 
with a transnational Muslim identity more than their national French identity. 
 
Previous Research – Fall 2012  
 
 Before discussing the literature on root causes and radicalization processes, it is useful to 
incorporate my previous research conducted in an independent study last semester with French 
Professor Nathalie Etoke. For this research, I analyzed radicalization in France, largely drawing 
from a paper called “Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-Radicalisation Strategy.” 
This work was published by the European research project Transnational Terrorism, Security, 
and the Rule of Law (TTSRL). Rather than using radicalization theories put forth by American 
theorists, this paper provided a useful analysis of radicalization because it forwards a European 
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perspective using the EU-official definition of radicalization. The project concretely defines 
radicalization as a process of socialization using the Council of the European Union’s 
definition: “The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to 
acts of terrorism.”8  
 
While this is a vague definition, the analysis that followed describes radicalization as 
distinct from terrorism, which is notable because in many cases the two are conflated. Instead, 
the TTSRL group states that terrorism is the worst possible outcome of the radicalization 
process; all terrorists have undergone the process but not all radicals are terrorists. An even more 
important distinction is that “radicals can engage in non-violent behavior without terrorist intent 
yet still be considered radical.”9 This is true, specifically in France where certain individuals may 
be considered radical for holding beliefs that run counter to French Republican values (wearing 
the headscarf in school, for example) without having committed violent acts against France. The 
TTSRL paper categorizes root causes of radicalization into different sets of factors (external, 
social and individual) and each has different degrees of influence on the individual. These 
categories are further broken down into causes and catalysts: causes provide the basis for 
radicalization and catalysts suddenly hasten the radicalization process. External factors include 
political, economic and cultural causes while social factors include social identification, network 
dynamics and relative deprivation causes. Finally, individual factors include psychological 
characteristics, personal experiences and degree of rationality. All three can be catalyzed by 
recruitment or trigger events.10 
 
First, external factors are considered to have an indirect effect on radicalization while 
social and individual factors are more likely to have a more immediate impact. External factors 
are considered to be less dominant because they constrain an individual’s environment, but that 
individual is assumed not to have a large influence on his or her environment in the first place.11 
Second, social factors are most relevant to my analysis because they “refer to mechanisms that 
position the individual in relation to relevant others”, in other words, they concern relative 
deprivation.12 Relative deprivation is important for my case study analysis because many of the 
societal problems in France reveal inequalities between the in-group (white, occidental French) 
and the out-groups (most recently, Muslims of immigrant descent). Third and finally, individual 
factors are those that are the most personal for the individual; however, this does not mean they 
have the most profound impact on the radicalization process. Instead, all three levels of causation 
interact to dictate the radicalization process.13  
 
Last semester, I applied the TTSRL framework in the context of the general French 
model of integration and its neocolonial tendencies. I then discussed its relevance to the concept 
of laicité (French secularism) and the headscarf controversy, as well as the Parisian banlieue 
(ghetto) dismal standards of living and finally, the hybrid French-Muslim identity crisis facing 
many second and third-generation immigrants. Using these concepts, I found that the TTSRL 
framework is relevant to the European Union in combatting radicalization and terrorism. 
However, on a country-by-country basis, my research found that it is inadequate because it is too 
vague. The concepts of integration, colonization, secularism, ghettos and identity politics are 
important for understanding the political, historical and cultural context that makes France an 
important case study for the incubation of potential terrorists. In the final section of this paper, I 
will discuss this case study of France and elaborate on these concepts.  
Section One: Root Causes of Radicalization 
Radicalization Theories 
 
 While the TTSRL paper presents an interesting argument, I don’t find it strong enough to 
employ as the basis of my present research. In this section, I will discuss various radicalization 
theories that I have come across throughout my CISLA research. These theories will be divided 
in two categories according to divisions in the literature. The first will discuss the root causes of 
radicalization according to various authors. The second category will discuss particular processes 
authors have suggested in hopes of elucidating the steps in the radicalization process. It is 
important to note that these theories tend to address either group terrorism (when an individual 
radicalizes/is recruited and joins a group) or lone wolf terrorism (when an individual self-
radicalizes, is inspired by a group’s ideology but acts separately from a group). To avoid 
confusion, I will treat these groups of theories separately and add a category of “alternative” 
theories for clarification purposes. The lone wolf categories will be the most sparse, as these 
theories will be more deeply explored in the following section.  
 
A. Root Causes of Radicalization 
 
I felt it necessary here to divide the discussion of root causes according to the context 
within which each author was operating. I don’t believe if an author is discussing group terrorism 
that his findings can necessarily be extrapolated to lone wolf cases. This stratification is thus 
useful for clarity purposes. 
 
i. Root Causes in the Group Context 
 
Although my research focuses mainly on lone wolves, theories about radicalization to 
group terrorism emphasize the importance of social solidarity and group dynamics in motivating 
an individual to terrorist acts. These group theories are included because they shed insight on the 
difficulties of self-radicalization and suggest potential implications for the existence of pure, true 
lone wolves. 
 
Jessica Stern’s 2010 research on de-radicalization proves useful in reinforcing Abrahms’ 
ideas about group dynamics as motivation to join a terrorist group. She emphasizes the role of 
the group in youth decisions to join terrorist organizations, “...once youth join an extremist 
group, the group itself can become an essential part of their identity, maybe even their only 
community.”14 Jocelyne Cesari (2011) concurs, arguing that joining the jihad is inherently a 
social process because the more discrimination that the members of a minority confront, the 
more they will unite around the perceived cause of that discrimination.15 Group dynamics, 
however, is only one factor that Stern considers in her analysis of motives to join terrorist 
organizations. She also analyzes the effects of social disadvantages such as unemployment and 
prejudice, as well as the role that ideology plays in motivation. Stern argues that all of these 
motivations can contribute to individual decisions to join a terrorist organization, “The reasons 
that people become terrorists are as varied as the reasons that others choose their professions.”16 
Thus, Stern’s discussion of group dynamics reinforces Abrahms’ theory, but her assertion that 
terrorists are motivated by more than just social benefits, and instead a plurality of factors, 
counters Abrahms’ argument. 
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Philippe Migaux, in his 2012 book Al Qaida: Sommes-nous menacés? (Al Qaida: Are we 
threatened?), says that feelings of exclusion are the primary motivator for individuals’ 
radicalizing. He says that whether one is a foot soldier or an individual in an executive or 
administrative position in a terrorist group, exclusion plays a role, albeit in different ways. Foot 
soldiers are typically excluded from the society, for example, whereas the chief will make a 
voluntary decision to exclude himself in the process of radicalization. Here is an interesting 
distinction between theories emphasizing social solidarity (like Max Abrahms’) and those 
emphasizing exclusion. The two are not the same. For example, an individual may be motivated 
by feelings of exclusion, but these feelings don’t necessarily lead him to want to join a group. 
This factor will be important in my later discussion of lone wolf theories. 
 
Finally, John Rosenthal (2006) points out that exclusion does not necessarily mean 
Islamist extremists hail from underprivileged milieus. Instead, he claims that jihadists are often 
recruited from more privileged social classes and are not only educated but also well traveled. He 
also said “openly avowed enthusiasm for jihad is clearly not the product of a spontaneous 
reaction to desperate circumstances, but rather the outcome of an often highly intellectualized 
process of reflection.”17  
 
ii. Root Causes in the “Alternative” Context 
 
 The term “alternative” is simply meant to distinguish the following theories as anything 
other than strictly group or lone wolf theories. Authors like Marc Sageman, for example, who 
talks about “leaderless jihad” that occurs outside an established group yet is not necessarily 
considered to be limited to lone wolf actions.  
 
Just as in group theories, the sentiment of exclusion is pervasive among authors 
discussing “alternative” theories. Mathieu Guidère (2010) discusses “new terrorists” who are 
often lone operators who communicate minimally with an outside terrorist group. He does, 
however, distinguish them from lone wolves, which justifies his placement in the “alternative” 
section. Guidère emphasizes the importance of isolation, resentment and a feeling of 
victimization in the creation of these “new terrorists.” Claude Moniquet, who spoke about 
radicalization in general during our interview, believes that this feeling of relative deprivation 
can actually be interpreted as an intellectual construction in order to place the blame for failure 
on someone else.18 Feelings of exclusion for alternative actors can, however, concretely derive 
from European integration policies. Sageman notes in his discussion of “leaderless jihad”, 
“Europeans seem reluctant to admit their ethnic diversity and cling to the myth of this national 
essence…Exclusion on the basis of a national essence makes it more likely for Muslim 
Europeans to believe [that they are a part of a war against Islam].”19 This resonates with my 
previous research on Max Abrahms, social solidarity theory and the role of government policy in 
the creation of grievances.  
 
Another theme in the “alternative” literature was the narrative of social solidarity. 
Guidère emphasized the importance of social solidarity saying, “...the solitary terrorist is 
searching, above all, for a fraternal bond.”20 Moreover, many terrorists in this category were 
described as acting in the name of others or the ummah – the Arabic word meaning community. 
Moniquet claims that though outside factors (like the Palestinian struggle against Israel) could 
Section One: Root Causes of Radicalization 
influence terrorists, he argues that individuals originally come to jihad for personal reasons. 
Whether they personally have grievances against society or whether they have been “guilted” in 
to acting on the part of disadvantaged Muslims around the world, there is often a general feeling 
that they must act to avenge perceived injustice.21 Sageman terms a similar phenomenon 
“vicarious poverty” and explains that while terrorists aren’t typically poor themselves, they can 
be motivated to action based on the indigence of others.22 Sageman forwards a similar concept 
called “moral outrage” which he says is an emotional response to a tragedy caused by other 
humans (as opposed to a natural disaster). In order to catalyze “moral outrage” the tragedy must 
resonate with an individual’s personal experiences and be enlarged within a group. Even without 
being physically a part of a group, then, an individual actor or leaderless resister can still be 
greatly influenced by group dynamics. For example, an individual who watches a news story 
about persecution of fellow Muslims and has experienced personal discrimination in France may 
experience “moral outrage.” “They interpret their perceived discrimination in the context of 
moral violations against Muslims elsewhere, and the notion that their local grievances are part of 
a more general hostility against Islam appears more compelling to them.”23 Sageman does 
specify, however, that local grievances are extremely important. For example, all Muslims are 
likely to see persecution of Palestinians on the nightly news and yet not all Muslims radicalize. 
 
iii. Root Causes in the Lone Wolf Context 
 
 Many of the root causes that affect the above theories also apply to lone wolves. 
However, because lone wolves operate outside a traditional command and control structure, the 
ideologies that act as root causes expand beyond the limits of political or social goals. Ramon 
Spaaij, a noted lone wolf terrorism scholar, claims in his most recent book Understanding Lone 
Wolf Terrorism (2011) that lone wolves may use larger terror ideologies to disguise personal 
motives for gain or revenge. Unlike terrorists who are members of a larger group, lone wolves 
“tend to create their own individualized ideologies from a mixture of broader political religious 
or social aims and personal frustrations and aversion.”24 Roger Bates (2012) concurs saying that 
lone wolves can be motivated by “personal agendas”.25 Specifically concerning Al Qaeda 
ideology, Raffaello Pantucci (2011) argues that the terrorist can “with certain ease superimpose 
upon [their own rationale] their understanding of the Al Qaeda narrative.”26 Often, lone wolf 
motivations take on a “macro-nationalist” sentiment, which Spaaij describes as “a variant of 
nationalism applied to clusters of nation states held together by a notion of shared (transnational) 
identity.” Individuals who strongly identify with macro-nationalism will perceive “their people” 
as under attack.27 In a way, lone wolves are thus more vulnerable to radicalization because 
absent a group hierarchy, they are free to turn any grievance into a root cause of radicalization, 
whereas members of groups are limited to actions within the group ideology.   
 
B. Theorizing the Radicalization Process 
 
Historical events and the passing of time have naturally changed the structures available 
to facilitate the radicalization process. Following the destruction of Al Qaeda training camps 
abroad, the group has resolved to serving in a more inspirational role.28 In a communication from 
June 2011, the group advocated more individual radicalization processes and attacks.29 It is 
important to note that all authors discuss the path to radicalization on an individual level, 
however the result of this radicalization is what defines the categories below: an individual 
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joining a group, an individual doing terrorism in an alternative way or an individual carrying out 
actions completely alone. 
 
i. Individuals Joining a Group or Organization  
 
In one of the most developed group radicalization theories, Tomas Precht (2007) names 
four stages in the radical path to homegrown terrorism: pre-radicalization, conversion and 
identification with radical Islam, indoctrination and increased group bonding and actual acts of 
terrorism or planned plots. He claims that background factors, trigger factors and opportunity 
factors influence these various stages. Background factors include personal traumas, the Muslim 
identity crisis, experience of discrimination and perceived injustice. Trigger factors include 
Western foreign policy, the myth of Jihad and presence of a charismatic leader or spiritual 
advisor. Finally, opportunity factors include the mosque, the Internet, prison, and universities.30 
Precht places significant emphasis on the influence of group bonding on homegrown terrorism. 
A similar theory by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt (2007) include the stages: pre-
radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization. One of the major facets of their 
theory is the role of the “spiritual sanctioner” who is valuable in producing the “us versus them” 
discourse and provides the moral justification for violence in the name of jihad. The importance 
of the sanctioner sheds light on the large amount influence Silber and Bhatt place on the role of 
social interaction and suggests further implications for the lone wolf path to radicalization.31 
 
Scott Helfstein (2012) terms four stages for his radicalization process: awareness, 
interest, acceptance and implementation. His focus is on the individual’s process to radicalization 
and seems to be applicable in both the group and lone context. It is included in the group section 
because it is not solely lone wolf-oriented, though it does lend interesting insight into the process 
for lone wolves. Helfstein argues that social interaction is important to a varying degree at the 
different stages of radicalization. It is most important at the acceptance stage, the most difficult 
stage to progress through because the individual is most vulnerable. In the implementation stage, 
on the other hand, social validation is not necessarily important.32 This helps explain why 
individuals may appear to be lone wolves when they attack, but further analysis over time shows 
encouragement and support existed in earlier stages of their radicalization. One pertinent 
example is the Boston marathon bombings: the Tsarnaev brothers appeared to be working alone 
at the outset of their attack, but evidence has since mounted implicating various potential co-
conspirators, including their mother. 
 
Petter Nesser (2009) distinguishes four types of terrorists who join jihadi cells 
specifically in Europe: the entrepreneurs, the protégés, the misfits and the drifters. He further 
claims that each of these groups undergoes a specific path to radicalization. While entrepreneurs 
and protégés are motivated by ideology and activism, the misfits are more driven by personal 
grievances. Finally, the drifters have less-specific reasons for engaging in jihad, and their 
recruitment is largely reliant on social and familial ties to individuals within the organization.33 If 
we were to apply his categories to lone wolf terrorism, it seems most likely that the misfits would 
be the most attracted by a lone path that allows them to avenge their personal grievances.  
 
 ii. Individuals in Alternative Contexts 
 
Section One: Root Causes of Radicalization 
In his theory of “leaderless jihad”, Marc Sageman (2008) outlines a basic process to 
radicalization. The first step is feelings of grievance or resentment towards a society or another 
group. The next step is to seek guidance from individuals who share the same beliefs but are 
further along in the radicalization process.34 This piece of information is important because it 
shows that Sageman’s “leaderless jihad” is truly an alternative theory, rather than a lone wolf 
theory. After making contact with similar individuals, a network begins to form. As individuals 
become increasingly radical, they tend to be abandoned by their “old friends”, or leave their 
mosque if it is not radical enough to suit their newfound piety. This double process creates 
“internal mutual reinforcement” and “intense group dynamics” among the newly radicalized and 
now isolated group.  
 
 iii. Individuals in Lone Wolf Terrorism 
 
Ramon Spaaij notes that certain challenges face lone wolves in their radicalization 
process compared to group processes. Notably, he claims there can be a disconnect between 
“theory and action, intention and capability.” Lone wolves can only successfully attack if they 
overcome “confrontational tension” which, he says, is countered by group emotional solidarity in 
group settings.35 In other words, it is difficult to progress to action without being surrounded by 
like-minded individuals. Jocelyn Cesari similarly notes, “joining the jihad is a social process.”36 
Nonetheless, later in Spaaij’s argument he claims that, “concrete personal relationships, kinship 
and friendship, as well as group dynamics and socialization into the use of violence are critical” 
in escalating an individual to violence.37 This emphasis on group dynamics seems contradictory 
to the inherent nature of a “lone” wolf. However, Spaaij specifies that group dynamics can 
actually lead an individual to become more isolated, “Those lone wolves who yearned to be a 
member of a group often found in the end that they had difficulty being accepted, feeling a part 
of or succeeding in a group.”38 Therefore, contrary to what previous scholars have said, group 
dynamics actually can be the reason an individual chooses to act alone. 
 
Roger Bates attempts to code a process for lone wolf radicalization (his “General Model 
of Lone Wolf Terrorism”) including four dimensions. First, he determines the extent of social 
interaction in an individual’s self-radicalization process. This can range from reading literature 
online to organizational exposure and training. Second, he measures motivation on a spectrum 
between egoistic and altruistic. Third, he determines whether the terrorist is conducting chaos or 
career terrorism. Chaos terrorism is an event that is “singularly disruptive” with large casualties, 
like a suicide bombing, while career terrorism is a continuous series of smaller violent attacks 
over a long period of time. Fourth, Bates he assesses where the individual lies along the 
continuum of risk-averse to risk seeking. These various factors allow him to predict the 
progression of an individual’s radicalization process.39 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, though the authors surveyed speak to different groups of terrorists and 
their analyses are thus inherently different, many of the root causes remain the same. We can 
isolate exclusion and social solidarity as prevailing themes in the root cause literature. Similarly, 
the scholars who define a process of radicalization show that at some point, social interaction is 
necessary for the majority of individuals to radicalize to the point of committing an attack. This 
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information will be important for the following section, dedicated to terrorist use of the Internet 
and the ways in which the Internet can at times substitute face-to-face interaction, making it 
easier for lone wolves to radicalization.  
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2. INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNET 
 
As technology advances, so do terrorist tactics. Terrorists always seem to be one step 
ahead of security services, finding new and innovative ways to use increasing interconnectedness 
to their advantage. Research on the topic of the Internet is not scant in the United States, but is 
weaker in Europe and especially France, where currently only one book (Les Nouveaux 
Terroristes by Mathieu Guidère) addresses the subject. While the literature pertaining to the U.S. 
is plentiful, it largely neglects to discuss the impact of the Internet on lone wolves, lending 
further pertinence to this research. In 2012, the annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
testified that the Internet is now the primary method of communication for lone actors recruited 
by Al Qaeda operating in Europe.1 That being said, the Internet is also an important tool for lone 
wolves and lone actors not connected to a larger group. Almost every contemporary book on 
terrorism addresses the impact of technology and most importantly, the Internet on terrorist 
activities. The following section will provide a thematic literature review of the most prominent 
contributions.  
 
Studying the Internet at this juncture is important because it is believed to be the specialty 
of the most recent Technological wave of terrorism.2 Marc Sageman (2008) claims that, “The 
Islamist Internet has become the virtual invisible hand organizing global Salafi terrorism 
worldwide.”3 Moreover, Scott Helfstein (2012) claims “Online interaction through social media 
and other outlets can provide the critical catalyst needed for validation and norm adoption as 
people progress through the stages of radicalization.”4 It is important to distinguish between 
cyberterrorism and the multitude of other uses of the Internet. Cyberterrorism, as defined by 
Dorothy Denning in a testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 2000, is: 
 
“…The convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to unlawful attacks and 
threats of attacks against computers, networks and the information stored therein 
when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of 
political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack 
should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough 
harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, or 
severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical 
infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks 
that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.”5 
Gabriel Weimann, noted cyberterrorism scholar, claims that cyberterrorism must further be 
distinguished from hacktivism – the fusion of hacking and activism. Weimann defines hacking as 
“activities conducted online and covertly that seek to reveal, manipulate, or otherwise exploit 
vulnerabilities in computer operating systems and other software.”6 He explains that hackers 
differ from hacktivists mainly in that they tend not to have political agendas. In addition to 
cyberterrorism, hacking and hacktivism, the Internet is a weapon in the hands of terrorists simply 
because of the access to information and social networks that it provides.  
 
The Internet is tactically useful for many reasons. Philippe Migaux (2012) establishes 
four principal functions: recruit and nourish radicalization, train militants in ideology, prepare 
operations and remind the adversary about the permanence of the threat.7 Sageman claims that 
the Internet is comprised of two major systems. The first is the Web, which provides a resource 
Section Two: Influence of the Internet 
for terrorists to inactively consult in order to reinforce pre-existing beliefs. The second is the 
structure of communication systems within the Internet that strengthen beliefs or feelings 
through discussion.8 These will serve as helpful categories in analyzing disparate forms of 
Internet use below. 
 
The Internet is attractive to terrorist groups because its own structure mimics the new, 
evolving and less-conventionally-connected structure of terrorist organizations. One of 
Weimann’s main points is that the structure of modern terrorism today is suitable to the structure 
of the Internet. Organizations are no longer able to meet and train in person, but the Internet has 
stepped in and facilitated a “virtual Afghanistan”.9 Moreover, the Internet is anonymous. This 
means that individuals can hide behind a screen name, helping them avoid the authorities and 
perhaps giving them confidence to make bolder assertions in online forums and chats. 
Furthermore, the structure of the Internet is perceived as free, meaning that any surveillance is 
considered by the public to be an infringement on civil liberties. An illustrative example of this 
dynamic is that, as of 2004, U.S. companies hosted 76% of Islamic terrorist websites.10 
 
This decentralized Internet structure is appealing for lone actors because of the absence 
of authorities and “elite-dominated media platforms.” 11  This absence gives disaffected 
individuals the ability to author their own identity and beliefs, a freedom they may not be 
afforded in real life. This section will analyze Internet usage for terrorist purposes by breaking 
down that usage in to three categories. The first is instrumental uses, which includes any use of 
the Internet for planning and execution of attacks. This section largely concerns Internet usage 
by terrorist group leaders or site managers, while the following two sections concern the 
individuals who consult these resources for help and guidance. The second section thus involves 
those “passively” consuming Internet material or terrorist propaganda; the third section discusses 
how the Internet can form a replacement social environment for disaffected individuals when 
they use it in a more active way. 
 
Instrumental Uses of the Internet 
 
The Internet provides many tools for terrorists. Weimann names seven different 
instrumental uses including data mining, networking, recruitment and mobilization, instructions 
and online manuals, planning and coordination, fundraising and attacking other terrorists. Most 
interesting among these is data mining, recruitment and mobilization, instructions and online 
manuals and fundraising. Data mining is the use of the Internet to assemble data and intelligence 
about potential targets. In early 2003, Donald Rumsfeld said a recovered Al Qaeda training 
manual revealed “using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is 
possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.” 12 
Furthermore, terrorists can easily gather information about potential followers who browse their 
websites, meaning that the Internet is an important tool for recruitment. Moreover, because the 
Internet is democratic, these potential followers can easily access online manuals; two of the 
most popular such manuals are “The Terrorist’s Handbook” and “The Anarchist’s Cookbook.” 
Weimann claims that “sophisticated” terrorists as well as “disaffected individuals” use these 
manuals, leading some to nickname certain sites as “online terrorism university.”13 A realistic 
manifestation of this nickname arrived in 2004 when Al Qaeda launched its online Al Battar 
Training Camp. Finally, Weimann says that terrorists both directly and indirectly solicit funds 
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for operations using the Internet. Some sites advertise a donation option, while others 
masquerade behind the facades of charities, NGOs or mosques that ultimately funnel the 
donations to terrorists.14 
 
Passive Consumption of Active Recruitment Propaganda 
 
Terrorist online propaganda is dynamic because websites often disappear and appear 
under new names on a daily basis. In 2006, Weimann estimated there were 4,300 websites 
serving terrorists and their supporters.15 Interestingly, these sites are available in many different 
languages but “almost invariably available in English”, making them very accessible to 
Americans and Western Europeans.16 Weimann claims that terrorists’ use of the Internet is part 
of a “psychological warfare” strategy to reach beyond those directly impacted by an attack to 
create a general sense of instability and anxiety in the target society.17 Moreover, the Internet is a 
useful propaganda tool because it has the potential to reach a large audience and, like the 
strategies behind marketing and advertising, can be tailored to specific target populations such as 
women and children.18 In a 2008 publication, Weimann points out that terrorists have adopted 
the marketing strategy of “narrowcasting”, by which they target their recruitment efforts to 
demographics like women and children. The logic of narrowcasting claims that, “Sophisticated 
persuasion is more likely to succeed when the medium, stimuli, appeals and graphics are tailored 
to specific receivers.” 19  
 
Furthermore, consumption of this material can actually be beneficial to individuals who 
feel vulnerable in the radicalization process – specifically lone wolves. The previous section on 
radicalization noted the importance of validation at certain points along the radicalization 
process. It was previously believed that this validation came from social interaction, however the 
Internet may now obviate the need for social contact. Silber and Bhatt point out particularly that 
consumption of terrorist propaganda can serve as spiritual justification for violence.20 It is 
important to point out that most individuals don’t haphazardly come across terrorist sites. Rather, 
they arrive at a site with already established religious convictions and grievances.21 Claude 
Moniquet echoes these sentiments, saying that many use the Internet to reaffirm their feelings 
and seek solidarity rather than as an embarking point for radicalization.22 These opinions reduce 
the explanatory power of passive consumption as a root cause of radicalization, but enhance the 
power of passive consumption as an accelerator during the radicalization process. 
 
Replacement Social Environment 
 
  In addition to passive consumption of online material, individuals can access chat rooms 
and forums that allow an interactive element in the radicalization process. “[The forum] provides 
them with a sense of belonging to a greater community on the basis of what they have in 
common: Islam.”23 This online community often provides the confidence needed to move from 
radicalization to committing a terrorist act.24 Scott Helfstein notes, “online interaction through 
social media and other outlets can provide the critical catalyst needed for validation and norm 
adoption as people progress through the stages of radicalization.”25 Mathieu Guidère (2010) 
notes that the “emir” of the site uses the pronoun “us” when posting in order to create an 
inclusive environment.26 Ramon Spaaij (2012) claims that these forums and chat rooms can act 
as “a replacement social environment” for disaffected people.27  
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Furthermore, not only does the Internet replace a physical social environment, but 
interaction online can be so powerful that it can encourage action in real life.28 Just as passive 
consumption can help a lone wolf along the radicalization process, so can direct interaction 
online. Guidère states that spiritual guides operate both in person and online and serve as the 
spiritual “green light” for a terrorist attack.29 Various authors posit that the online structure of 
communication systems fosters social interaction, and this interaction is of varying degrees of 
importance throughout the radicalization process. Helfstein’s aforementioned four stages of 
radicalization demonstrate that social interaction, whether virtual or in-person, is most important 
at the acceptance stage. Individuals in this stage are often vulnerable and in need of support. It is 
here, he claims, that the majority of lone wolves, “seeking social ties and validation,” were 
arrested by security services.30 Similarly, Silber and Bhatt (2007) claim (based on their four 
stages: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization) that the Internet is 
helpful in the indoctrination phase and fully manifests itself in the jihadization phase where 
radicals “challenge and encourage each others move to action.”31  
 
The decentralized structure provided by the Internet is nonetheless dangerous. Marc 
Sageman notes that chat forums can quickly become a type of “echo chamber” because while 
strong believers actively voice their opinions, those who are not so sure of the validity of these 
opinions tend not to voice dissenting arguments. This creates a groupthink atmosphere. John 
Curtis Amble (2012) defines this as “crowd sourcing” when a sense of group membership builds 
as individuals identify more and more strongly with an ideology; the group atmosphere makes 
individuals more likely to act on behalf of that ideology.32 Moreover, Sageman notes that leaders 
have no way of enforcing their control on the Internet structure. 33 Alternatively, Guidère 
cautions that exclusion can also exist on websites between truly dedicated and less-dedicated 
members.34 
 
Finally, it is important to note that beyond chat rooms and forums on designated terrorist 
or terrorist-sympathizer websites, radicals use everyday social networking tools like Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube. Weimann calls social networking in general the “terrorist apparatus”, 
especially for the newer, younger generation of terrorists.35 Regardless of how it is used, the 
mere existence of the Internet has large consequences for the study of terrorism, especially lone 
wolf terrorism. 
 
Implications  
 
 Most scholars do not believe that an individual can fully radicalize using the Internet. 
Sageman claims that the Internet can “encourage” lone wolves while Cyndi Mellon (2012) states, 
“[Internet action] is often not the end of the road for the jihadist.”36 Tomas Precht deems it 
“unlikely” that an individual could completely radicalize using only Internet means.37 Ramon 
Spaaij claims that “Internet can be an incubator or accelerator of lone wolf terrorism” but is not a 
cause of lone wolf terrorism.38 Experts like Claude Moniquet believe that face-to-face interaction 
at some point is still crucial. However, the power of the Internet in facilitating radicalization is 
undeniable and has significant implications for conventional lone wolf definitions. Can a lone 
wolf be considered such if he/she has interacted in chat forums online? Does a pure lone wolf 
exist in the information age? These questions will be addressed in the next section, focusing 
solely on lone wolf terrorism. 
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3. LONE WOLF TERRORISM 
 
It is clear that throughout history, the power of lone wolves have been underestimated. 
Jeffrey Simon (2013), one of the leading lone wolf scholars, estimates that it was lone wolves 
who conducted the first midair plane bombing, vehicle bombing, hijackings, product 
contaminations and anthrax attacks in the United States.1 While Western governments focused 
their energy on Al Qaeda, a more menacing threat was evolving – one that would prove less 
deadly than group terrorism (so far), but more difficult to detect. Lone wolves like Anders 
Brevik in Norway and Nidal Malik Hassan in the United States show the deadly potential of this 
evolving trend. For my discussion of lone wolf terrorism, I focused mainly on the two most 
recent academic books: Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism by Ramon Spaaij (2011) and Lone 
Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat by Jeffrey Simon (2013). I sought out 
further sources from the footnotes of these books. This research is augmented by primary source 
interviews conducted in France and Belgium in January 2013.  
 
History: “Waves” of Terrorism 
 
 When talking about the evolution of lone wolf terrorism, it is useful to categorize the 
phenomenon into historical time frames. David C. Rapoport is credited with the idea of “waves” 
of terrorism, designated as such in 2002.2 The waves are as follows: the Anarchist wave (began 
in 1880s), the Anti-Colonial wave (began in the 1920s), the New Left wave (began in the 1960s) 
and the Religious wave which began in 1979 and is expected to continue until 2020.3 The waves 
typically span the length of one generation and are launched by major events. The Religious 
wave, for example, came about in the context of the Iranian Revolution, Muslim resistance and 
victory against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as well as the fact that 1979 marked the start of 
a new century on the Muslim calendar.4 Simon, in a 2010 publication “Technological and Lone 
Operator Terrorism: Prospects for a Fifth Wave of Global Terrorism”, proposed a fifth wave of 
terrorism called the Technological wave.5 This fifth wave differs from its predecessors because it 
is not dominated by a particular ideology; rather it equally benefits all ideologies that take part.6 
Simon argues that this wave was sparked by the invention of the Internet and it is not mutually 
exclusive from the Religious wave. It is in this unique overlap that we find the case study of 
Mohamed Merah, to be discussed in the following section.   
 
 Marc Sageman also suggests the idea of “waves” in his book Leaderless Jihad (2008), 
though his categories are more defined by the catalyzing events that characterized and inspired 
each distinct group of terrorists. Sageman identifies three waves in global Islamist terrorism. The 
first wave is considered “the old guard” – those who fought against the Soviets and today form 
the core of Al Qaeda central. Sageman claims that these men are extremely loyal to one another 
even though some differ ideologically. They hail for the most part from the middle and upper 
class. The second wave is made up of those who joined the Islamist social movement in the 
1990s. They come mainly from the middle class and were inspired by the persecution of 
Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and the Philippines.7 Sageman considers the end of the 
second wave to be the military invasion in Afghanistan following 9/11, when many training 
camps were destroyed. The third wave he terms the “post-Iraqi invasion generation”, which is 
comprised of those who live in the West who are second generation or children of Muslim 
immigrants – they thus belong to lower social classes than the previous two waves.  
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The European Context 
 
 As in the United States, the threat of lone wolf jihadi terrorism is currently considered to 
be one of the major menaces facing Europe. It is important to note that many of the studies in the 
literature survey treat lone wolf terrorism and jihadi terrorism separately. Until the Madrid train 
bombings in 2004, the jihadi terrorist threat was perceived to be one external to Europe.8 
However, since 9/11 there have been over 2,300 arrests related to Islamist terrorism in Europe 
compared to 60 in the United States.9 Concerning lone wolf terrorism, the most marked increase 
in recent decades was in fact in Europe – attacks quadrupled between the 1970s and 2000s.10 
Sageman posits that the reason behind this is that Europeans “cling to the myth of [their] national 
essence” and neglect to fully recognize the diversity and multiculturalism within their borders.11 
Claude Moniquet, Director of European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), 
mentioned that the lone wolf terrorist threat is the most serious challenge to Europe, specifically 
in France because “France is exciting for extremists” given its insistence on secularism.12 
Furthermore, France was involved in the War on Terror in North Africa, Afghanistan and most 
recently in Mali – foreign policy decisions that can potentially create grievances among Muslims 
living in France.  
 
Definition 
 
In my research I encountered many definitions of lone wolf terrorism; I will discuss these 
below and offer my own suggestion for use in this paper. Ramon Spaaij defines lone wolves as 
“terrorists who carry out attacks individually and independently from established terrorist 
organizations.” He further specifies this by saying that the attacks are carried out by someone 
who operates individually, does not belong to an organized group or network and whose modi 
operandi are “conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or 
hierarchy.” In his definition of lone wolf terrorism, Spaaij leaves open the possibility that the 
lone wolf may have interacted with others during his radicalization process and may even have 
received training. His theory hinges upon the influence of group dynamics at some point in the 
individual’s trajectory to terrorism.13  
 
In his book Leaderless Jihad, Marc Sageman discusses the new phenomenon of 
leaderless actors committing attacks in the name of Al Qaeda but with no direct affiliation with 
the group. He does not specifically talk about lone wolf terrorism, but addresses lone actors and 
small cells that operate without a higher authority structure. Various authors employ the idea of 
“leaderless resistance” as a characteristic of lone wolves and their ideologies, therefore the 
mention of Sageman’s work is useful in this section. 
 
Stricter than the authors above is Gabriel Weimann; in his 2012 article “Lone Wolves in 
Cyberspace,” he defines the lone wolf as an individual using traditional terrorist tactics to 
achieve political or ideological goals. He emphasizes the fact that the individual must be acting 
outside a command structure and without cooperation with others, or membership in a group. He 
does say, however, that lone wolves “are not really alone.”14 Furthermore, Scott Helfstein, in his 
2012 article titled “Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent 
Extremism”, employs a similarly severe definition stating a “strict definition” of lone wolf 
terrorism would exclude any individuals who had contact with a larger organization or received 
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training at any point along the radicalization process. Moreover, he mentions  “individuals cease 
to be lone wolves once they become part of the social community be it physical or virtual.”15 
This has implications for the growing use of the Internet among lone wolves, demonstrated in the 
previous section to have the power to create a formidable virtual community.  
 
Many authors chose to define the lone wolf with leniency, allowing for more social 
interaction or guidance in the radicalization process. Jeffrey Simon, the most recent scholar to 
publish on this topic in 2013, suggests that lone wolves are only permitted “minimal support 
from one or two people” to be considered as such.16 Moreover, conversations with scholars and 
intelligence professionals in France yielded interesting insights on the topic of lone wolves. 
Claude Moniquet said that he doesn’t believe the “pure” lone wolf exists. At some point or 
another, Moniquet believes that physical contact is necessary for reassurance and comfort and 
this physical contact compromises an individual’s lone wolf label.17 Mathieu Guidère, prominent 
scholar and author of the book Les Nouveaux Terroristes (2010), coined the term “new terrorist” 
to designate individuals who self-radicalize, outside of an organized group but who are often 
inspired by the ideologies of larger groups. His book delved in to case studies of “new terrorist” 
online interaction, implying that even though the new terrorist may self-radicalize, he can receive 
online help.18 
 
A final strategy adopted by these terrorism scholars was an attempt to define a typology 
model for lone wolf terrorists that indicated the disparate levels of authority and socialization 
involved in various cases. Two authors engaged in this work; the first is Raffaello Pantucci 
(2011) who categorizes lone wolves into loners, lone wolves, lone wolf packs and lone 
attackers.19 These categories will be further explored in the social identification section below. 
Building on Pantucci’s work is Robert Bates (2012) who formulates what he calls the “General 
Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism” which is comprised of four dimensions: extent of involvement 
in radicalization (level of socialization), motivation (egoistic or altruistic), form of terrorism 
(chaos or career) and degree of risk (risk-seeking or risk-aversion).20 Each dimension can interact 
with the others in ways to produce varying versions of lone wolves. These scholars thus do not 
give explicit definitions; rather they realize that the term “lone wolf” has many variations.  
 
Multiple Levels of Social Identification 
 
 One of the most interesting aspects of different lone wolf theories is their residual tie to 
group dynamics and social identification. Obviously, various definitions permit different degrees 
of social interaction, but these dynamics came into play in ways I hadn’t expected. For example, 
Spaaij claims that even lone wolves experience “social identification” with broad struggles (be 
they political, social or religious). This identification from afar allows the lone wolf to categorize 
the world into “us” versus “them” even though he or she is not physically a member of the group 
in question. Spaaij notes, “concrete personal relationships, kinship and friendship, as well as 
group dynamics and socialization into the use of violence are critical in escalating someone to 
terrorist attacks.”21 This seems contradictory to the lone wolf definition; however, his later 
explanation clarifies this assertion. He notes that lone wolves tend to be socially inept and thus 
may purposefully stay away from group settings.22 Furthermore, these individuals may be 
isolated based on bad experiences with group membership in the past.23 Therefore, the social 
dynamics that lead them to terrorism don’t necessarily need to be positive. It is interesting to 
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question whether identifying with a movement ideologically is as socially gratifying for lone 
wolves as Max Abrahms’ idea of social solidarity is for individuals who are physically a part of 
terrorist organizations. The idea of negative identification as a result of group rejection may 
prove useful in the Mohamed Merah case study because as a Muslim, Merah felt largely 
marginalized and rejected by the French and thus isolated from the French identity. Applying 
Spaaij’s idea of ideological movement identification to the question of national identity may be 
an interesting research avenue to explore. 
 
Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley in their 2010 article “The Psychology of Lone 
Wolf Terrorism,” suggest that group identification can occur without the lone wolf physically 
belonging to a group through a theory they call “strong reciprocity.” They state, “We can come 
to care about the welfare of groups that we are not a part of.”24 The identification with this group 
can, at a certain point, eclipse personal welfare, “Positive identification with a group, combined 
with the perception that this group is being victimized, produces negative identification with the 
group perpetrating the injustice.”25 This would explain lone wolves who act to avenge a group 
that they are not a part of. 
 
Pantucci suggests in “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone 
Islamist Terrorists” (2011) that four types of lone actors exist and they differ primarily based on 
their social interaction and command structure. The loner uses Islam as a cover for other social 
or personal grievances; this individual does not have ties with other extremists “except through 
what they can access through passive consumption.”26 The term “passive consumption” denotes 
use of secondary sources and does not include online chat room interaction. The lone wolf, on 
the other hand, does communicate via email and chat rooms and may have experienced training 
or contact prior to committing a violent act. The lone wolf pack is a group of individuals who 
have self-radicalized and communicate via the Internet.27 Finally, a lone attacker is an individual 
acting alone but within an explicit command and control structure affiliated with or directly 
related to Al Qaeda.28 
 
Finally, in Bates’ first dimension of his General Model, he posits as a category the 
“extent of involvement in radicalization.” This questions the extent to which the self-
radicalization process involves socialization with external contacts. He deems self-radicalization 
to be “personal” when it concerns simple consultation of secondary sources, the “exposure to 
ideology and literature online,” for example. A more involved radicalization process involves 
previous exposure to organizations and/or training.29 
 
Ideology 
 
 The ideology of a lone wolf reflects that this type of actor is “not 100% terrorist and not 
100% criminal” – he occupies the space somewhere in between.30 Spaaij states, “lone wolves 
tend to create their own individualized ideologies from a mixture of broader political, religious 
or social aims and personal frustrations and aversion.”31 In fact, Simon elaborates that lone 
wolves are liberated from the group ideology and are thus free to combine ideology with 
personal, psychological or criminal motives.32 Conversely, some authors, like Gabriel Weimann, 
consider lone wolves to share a common ideology with a group even though they do not 
communicate with that group.33 
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Given that the group I am studying is Muslim lone wolves, Islam is obviously an 
important ideological factor. It is often used as a religious justification for violence despite the 
fact that, as many authors have noted, terrorists typically have a very weak comprehension of 
their own religious texts.34 Further, Bates suggests that the use of Islam is simply a cover for 
certain types of lone wolves disguising their true personal frustrations. Islam can also prove very 
associative for certain lone wolves – for example, it may act as the larger, transnational 
movement for which a terrorist wants to avenge past injustices. Based on my interview with 
Claude Moniquet, it seems that Islam is perceived as a very inclusive religion; he said, “You find 
a family when you find Islam.”35 This indicates that for converts as well as those born into Islam, 
it is a fitting example to justify atrocities because for many, it may be the only community to 
which they truly feel they belong. Or, conversely, it may be a community with which an 
individual sympathizes and for which they will compromise personal welfare. 
 
Analysis  
 
The definitions of lone wolf terrorism offered above are ambiguous at best. It is 
obviously quite challenging to assess the level of outside contact an individual had (for example, 
if they received training in the past – how long ago must if be for that individual to still be 
considered lone?) and the nature of that contact (if online – did the individual “passively” consult 
texts online or actively participate in radical chat forums?). I tend to agree with Claude Moniquet 
and his assertion that a pure lone wolf does not actually exist. Theories of radicalization 
described in the previous section suggest the importance of affirmation and reassurance before 
committing a violent attack, and I do believe that in most cases an individual will seek social 
approval before turning violent. Nonetheless, it is useful to limit this definition.  
 
For my purposes, a lone wolf cannot have had specific training with an authority figure 
within three years prior to his attack. By authority figure, I refer to an individual who has 
experience with terrorism and radicalization. I choose the number three because anything less 
than that would compromise the “leaderless” aspect of the attack. For example, if the authority 
figure in question trained the lone wolf for a specific attack, we wouldn’t imagine that the 
individual would perpetrate the attack immediately. However, after a period of three years 
without follow-up contact with the authority figure, it could be justified as a lone wolf attack. It 
is also useful to distinguish between individuals who seek training for social solidarity and those 
who are simply looking for information from a knowledgeable individual. This is arguably 
difficult to determine, and the abundance of authors indicating the importance of social dynamics 
even among lone wolves may actually point to a misunderstanding of individuals’ motivations in 
reaching out to authority figures. 
 
Importantly, “training” is considered as such only if a member or leader of a terrorist 
organization (an authority figure) administers it. On the other hand, social interaction can also 
occur in other forms. A terrorist can be indoctrinated in prison, by family members or by a 
radical imam. While these interactions are very important for terrorists, they cannot be 
categorized as “training.” What distinguishes training from indoctrination is the degree of agency 
that the individual radicalizing holds. For example, if the individual actively seeks guidance from 
an authority figure, this can be considered training (even if it is not the type of training we 
imagine when picturing former Al Qaeda camps). This type of social interaction voids an 
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individual’s status as a lone wolf. However, indoctrination can occur without an individual’s 
consent. For example, if one is locked in a prison cell or around the family dinner table, escaping 
radical discussions is easier said than done. Moreover, continuous exposure may lead the 
individual to similar beliefs as those surrounding him. Thus indoctrination can happen to lone 
wolves and other individuals, however a lone wolf’s exposure is more limited to this 
indoctrination whereas others may have trained as well. 
 
Putting the difference between training and indoctrination in context is Raffaello 
Pantucci’s idea of “passive” Internet consumption.36 The same can be said for training and 
indoctrination – training represents a more active route to radicalization while indoctrination 
implies a more passive radicalization. A true lone wolf would not have sought out training within 
the three years preceding his attack, however he may have been indoctrinated in contexts like 
prison or the family structure. To distinguish between individuals who meet these criteria and 
those who deviate from this path yet still conduct attacks autonomously and alone, I introduce 
the term “lone actor.” This is by no means my own term, but its origins cannot be traced to one 
specific author. In any case, I am applying my own definition to the term here. A lone actor 
differs from a lone wolf primarily in that his process of radicalization can include indoctrination 
and training, with no temporal limits, as long as he carries out his attack separately from any 
specific instructions from a group. This distinction is important and is derived from Pantucci’s 
typology of lone wolves, where he differentiates between “lone wolves” (corresponding to my 
definition of lone actors) and other types of individuals acting alone.”37 In any case, both lone 
wolves and lone actors according to my definitions must act autonomously.  
 
Determining a definition for autonomous action becomes increasingly difficult with the 
influence of the Internet. The literature from the previous section demonstrates the way in which 
a chat forum can become a “replacement social environment” for vulnerable individuals.38 
Especially when considering online environments that degenerate to groupthink, it is difficult to 
assess whether or not actions stemming from such conversations are truly autonomous. This is 
outside the perimeter of my current study, but may be an interesting future research avenue. 
Nonetheless, it is important to integrate some aspect of the Internet into my definitions of a lone 
wolf and lone actor. From the literature, it is clear that two types of online radicalization exist. 
Based on Pantucci’s terminology, I will call them “passive” and active consumption. They also 
closely parallel my terms used above – indoctrination and training. Passive consumption 
indicates consultation of online materials and propaganda. Active consumption denotes 
interaction in chat rooms to exchange ideas, seek spiritual justification for violence or simply 
gain confidence. Fittingly, the true lone wolf only passively consults the Internet, while the lone 
actor actively utilizes chat rooms in preparation for an attack or at certain points along the 
radicalization process.  
 
The following section considers the specific French context of my Senior Integrative 
Project and discusses the case study of Mohamed Merah. The terminology specified in the 
present section will be applied to this case in order to determine whether or not Merah was 
indeed a lone wolf.  
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4. CASE STUDY – FRANCE AND MOHAMED MERAH 
 
Assessing the Threat 
 
In 1986, France passed anti-terrorism legislation that defined terrorism as “any act in 
relation to a terrorist enterprise individually or collectively, to seriously disturb public order 
through intimidation or terror.”1 In fact, the term terrorism actually originated in France during 
the Reign of Terror in 1793; however, this does not mean that terrorism dominates national 
consciousness. In fact, my personal experiences in France with professors, coworkers and 
interview subjects showed me that people don’t generally perceive homegrown Islamist 
terrorism as a true threat. It is thus useful here to delineate how big the threat actually is.  
 
 In the decade following September 11, France fared better than its European neighbors. 
In fact, France’s experience with terrorism comes mainly from the mid-1990s. What follows is a 
summary of the main terrorist attacks. In December of 1994, four members of the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) hijacked an Air France plane and killed three passengers on board. In a series of 
attacks between August and October 1995, the GIA exploded gas bottles inside the Paris St. 
Michel metro station and near the Arc de Triomphe, planted an additional bomb found by police 
on the railroad tracks of a high-speed train near Lyon and exploded a car bomb at a Jewish 
school in the same town. Roughly a month later, another bomb exploded in the Maison Blanche 
station of the metro in Paris and another gas bottle exploded between two popular stations of a 
commuter rail line (RER C) in Paris. In March of 1996, a car bomb was found outside a police 
station in Lille, a few days before a G7 summit was to occur. The Roubaix Gang – a terrorist cell 
with supposed links to Al Qaeda – claimed responsibility for this attack. Since this time, there 
have been no major attacks, but the French police have disrupted multiple cells in the Paris 
region and all over the country.2 Philippe Migaux (2012) estimated that the Salafist movement in 
France is made up of approximately 15,000 individuals.3 One important emerging trend is that of 
converts to Islam. Olivier Roy estimates that more than 10,000 converts live in France, though 
the majority of them converted for non-radical reasons.4 Nonetheless, Claude Moniquet (the 
director of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center), also pointed out the threat 
of converts and explained why Islam is attractive for disaffected individuals: “It is easy to 
convert, easy to leave. It is a very inclusive religion. When you become a Muslim you find a 
family, you find friends.”5 
 
Marc Sageman (2008) notes that since September 11, there have been over 2,300 arrests 
connected to Islamist terrorism in Europe compared to 60 in the United States. Further, the rate 
of arrests per capita among Muslims is six times higher in Europe than in the United States.6 
Moniquet claims, “Islamist terrorism is the biggest threat in Europe.”7 In the interest of not 
sounding alarmist, he specified that radicalization concerns approximately ten to fifteen percent 
of young Muslims in Europe.8 In a personal interview, Moniquet said that France is particularly 
exciting for extremists given the large population of Muslims, clear image of a secular state 
(including bans on the veil) and French involvement in the War on Terror. Moniquet also 
claimed that, as in many parts of the world, the threat has evolved from one of organizations like 
Al Qaeda to more solitary structures, like those of lone wolves.9 
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The French Jihadist  
  
 Migaux posits that French jihadist militants today, for the most part, were born and raised 
in France.10 Jean Luc Marret (2009) notes that between the mid-1990s and 2006, the French 
Muslims involved in attacks came from immigrant (primarily Algerian) communities with low 
levels of education.11 They typically fall in to delinquency in their youth and progress to 
terrorism in their 20s and 30s.12 Roy claims that many French Muslims who gravitated towards 
Al Qaeda came from destitute suburbs (called banlieues), but their motivation was not their own 
poverty but the “recasting of a lost identity.”13 While they may not be primarily motivated by 
disadvantaged circumstances, Marret argues that areas with high unemployment rates are 
“particularly sensitive to radical proselytizing.”14 It is clear that the biggest areas of contention 
for French jihadists are identity, integration, French secularism and the headscarf and burka 
limitations, and the banlieue ghettos. I will now discuss these salient factors, based on research 
conducted in the fall of 2012, to provide a more in-depth understanding of the following case 
study concerning Mohamed Merah.   
 
Identity 
 
In John Rosenthal’s 2006 analysis of interviews conducted with suspected members of Al 
Qaeda in French prisons, a unifying theme among inmates was an intense hatred of France based 
on a perceived impossibility to ever “be French” in the eyes of the white French majority.15 This 
sentiment was corroborated in the French media following Mohamed Merah’s killing spree; 
many questioned whether he was truly “French” despite having been born and raised in France.16 
Furthermore, family reunification plans in the 1970s complicated an already-challenging colonial 
past by anchoring immigrants in France for good. France continues to have contentious relations 
with these populations today because of an inability to recognize colored people as French. This 
in turn makes identification with France difficult for some Muslims of immigrant origin. 
 
Similarly, Kiran Grewal (2007) argues that even second and third-generation immigrants, 
legal French citizens, are considered foreigners, which “demonstrates the reality that true 
integration is not considered possible for certain groups within the French national space.” 
Hypothetically, following this logic, even if a French Muslim citizen of immigrant descent 
adopted a fully-French identity following the French integration guidelines, he or she could still 
remain a foreigner due to France’s own labeling of he or she as such.17 An example published in 
The Economist in 1999 shows the falsity in this argument because most immigrants have lost 
touch with the cultures of their ancestors; “The children and grandchildren of Algerians or 
Moroccans who stepped off the boats in Marseilles in the 1960s are French. The closest many of 
them have ever been to North Africa is the local Moroccan restaurant.”18 
 
Identity crises are exacerbated in France because not only are immigrants definitively 
members of an out-group, but they are also stripped of their ability to define themselves. Here, 
media representations have a high capacity to influence definition of identity. Anne Sophie 
Lamine, Professor of Sociology at the University of Strasbourg, mentioned in a personal 
interview that the media is guilty of making amalgamations between “good” or “moderate” 
Muslims and radical Muslims, though she affirmed that media coverage is growing more 
sensitive to these issues.19  When a group is consistently represented in a demeaning or 
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amalgamating way, the group develops a prescriptive identity based on how others define them, 
as opposed to how they define themselves. Paradoxically, the Stasi Commission (established in 
2003 to analyze secularism in French society) argued that the French concept of laicité 
(secularism) should permit “one to define oneself in relation to one’s cultural and spiritual 
references without being subjected to them.”20 Thus, while a cornerstone of French republican 
ideals encourages self-definition, white French society consistently manufactures an identity for 
Muslims of immigrant descent. 
 
Furthermore, the Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL) paper 
– discussed in the first section of this paper, claims that “identity threat” can also be a factor 
leading to radicalization.21 The paper claims that when a social identity is threatened (for 
example, Muslim religious or cultural rights), the group tends to “withdraw into a strictly 
specified, inward-focused community.” Interestingly, the paper places the emphasis on the 
group’s action to withdraw. In France, however, because the white majority defines the identities 
of colored minorities it begs the question: are radical Muslims themselves withdrawing or are 
they being forced to withdraw? The paper continues on to say that depending on the strength of 
the identification with a certain group, reactions to identity threat will vary. Further, the authors 
hypothesize that “for high identifiers, perceived discrimination or stigmatization based on Islam 
is expected to trigger their religious identity to be the most prominent indicator of attitudes and 
behavior.”22 This analysis has interesting implications for counter-terrorism policy because, if we 
believe that French Muslims have taken on identities defined by white French instead of defined 
by themselves, any violent reaction stemming from identity threat can be seen as the fault of the 
French state. In other words: if French Muslims identify with a certain group based on media 
representations of their supposed identities, their identification with that group – and any actions 
they may commit in the name of that group – are thus directly attributable to France.  
 
Integration 
 
The French model of integration is very strict, specifically in the sense that it mandates 
the superiority of a French national identity above all others, be they religious, cultural, racial, 
sexual or gender-based. The goal is to see all citizens as French and thus, equal.23 Alternatively, 
one could argue, as do Schnapper, Krief and Peignard (2007), that French integration isn’t a 
policy at all, “…the lack of a specific integration policy is the best way to integrate migrants, as 
they are simply considered as French citizens.”24 The integration model functioned well, though 
never ideally, in the period after World War II. When the reconstruction period mandated 
additional labor sources, immigrants of former North African countries served this purpose. 
These immigrants, however, were always expected to return to their country of origin. It was 
only in the 1970s and 1980s, when the possibility of returning home for these workers 
diminished and the policy of family reunification anchored them in the Republic for good. This 
policy meant that the families of immigrant workers in France (primarily male workers) were 
able to migrate from their countries of origin to France. This led to a large influx of immigrants 
who didn’t speak the French language; many settled in disadvantaged ghetto communities today 
referred to as banlieues. Moreover, decades later, the experience of these second and third-
generation immigrants is still characterized by segregation and discrimination. “Unlike early 
twentieth century European immigrants, these second-generation North Africans have been 
penalized not only by a sluggish economy but also because of their ethno-racial 
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characteristics.”25 Marco Oberti (2008) further posits the vulnerability of these populations to 
express their frustrations through Islam or violence.26 
 
Because many second and third-generation immigrants hail from former colonies, it is 
impossible to ignore the colonial legacy implicit in immigration and integration politics today. 
France continues to enforce “republican universalism” on immigrants as it did on the indigènes 
(indigenous people) during the civilizing missions of the colonial era. Matthew Gordner (2008) 
postulates that France is “unwilling to acknowledge and include [immigrants’] respective 
historical narratives” in the integration model.27 But this statement alone shows a contradiction 
inherent in discussions of colonization: it is not simply the history of immigrants that must be 
recognized, but it is France’s own shared history with its former colonies and their peoples. 
However, for France, recognizing this shared history is tantamount to admitting past injustices. 
Instead of recognizing shared roots, France does the opposite. Kiran Grewal (2007) asserts that 
the confrontation between Islam and laicité today is a “post-colonial reassertion of dominance.”28 
The problem is that the French continue to imagine the people of former colonies as “elsewhere” 
even though these now citizens are firmly established within France.29 This concept is evoked by 
the documentary Voyage en Beurgoisie whose title plays on the word bourgeoisie using the 
French word “beur”, meaning a French-born individual with parents from North African 
countries. One person interviewed said, “Je pense qu’une société ne peut pas se construire de 
manière harmonieuse sur ce qu’elle n’est plus.” (“I don’t think a society can construct itself 
harmoniously based on something it no longer is.”)30 It is clear that French national identity is 
thus still imagined through a lens of homogeneity that hasn’t truly existed for a century.31 This 
results in the creation of an in-group (white, occidental French) and multiple out-groups, one of 
which is French Muslims of immigrant descent.  
 
Multiple authors in my present research discussed the impact of European integration 
systems on homegrown terrorism.  Precht (2007) claims that “structural problems in Western 
societies” contribute to grievances, while Rem Korteweg et. Al. (2009) argued “the 
fundamentalist perception of the world draws support for its actions precisely from the policies 
of Western states.”32 Claude Moniquet takes a position more defensive of French integration 
policy, saying that radicalized Muslims miss several steps in the integration process, often to 
their own fault.33 Although I didn’t ask him to elaborate on this point in the interview, his 
assertion appears to have been that radicals somehow don’t commit to integration in French 
society. From my knowledge about the French integration system, this could mean any host of 
things: they may have refused to take French language classes, been convicted of delinquent 
crimes or affirmed radical beliefs like sending their daughters to school wearing headscarves. All 
of these are considered markers of integration, and it is likely that Moniquet’s reference to 
“steps” refers more to these indicators than to a specifically defined integration process. 
 
Laicité and Cultural Laws  
 
One cornerstone of French integration policy, and French republican values in general, is 
laicité, translated literally to mean “secularism.” Laicité requires that all religious practices and 
identities remain in the private sphere. This concept plays out largely in educational institutions, 
which are considered responsible for social integration and the creation of good French 
citizens.34 One of the most contentious issues of laicité is the ban on the Islamic headscarf – a 
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law that resulted after numerous “headscarf affairs” in the late 1980s and 1990s. 35 At first 
glance, this law appears discriminatory but as Elaine Thomas (2008) explained, the first 
headscarf affair in Creil in 1989, and the controversy thereafter, can be interpreted in many ways. 
For example, school administrators were facing problems with a Jewish “clique” and limiting 
religious symbols was originally meant to temper the behavior of these Jewish students. It was 
only when Muslim girls began insisting on wearing the headscarf that the policy began to target 
them as well.36 The headscarf affair can also be understood against the backdrop of the right-
wing National Front political party dialogue, which treated Muslim girls as enemies of the 
Republic. Jean-Marie Le Pen (the president of the National Front at the time) called the 
headscarf affair “the implantation of foreign colonies in France”; put differently, he claimed 
these young girls were “colonizing” contemporary France.37 Of a different argument was Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing who said, “I would take my shoes off if I went into a mosque,” implying that 
Muslim girls should take headscarves off when entering a French, secular school. However, this 
quote reveals the real crux of the headscarf issue: true French-born (though Muslim) citizens are 
still being treated as guests who must respect the host country.38 
 
Since that first headscarf affair in Creil, not much has changed as it relates to the 
treatment of immigrants and French citizens of immigrant descent. In February 2004, France 
passed a law banning “the wearing of signs or dress by which students ostensibly express a 
religious belonging.”39 As Thomas points out, however, between 1989 and 2004, the discourse 
around headscarves became increasingly centered on women’s rights. Thomas claims that the 
law is today understood within the conception that citizenship is a “realization of individuality” 
and an “emancipation of the individual as a rational agent from groups seeking to control their 
members.”40 Essentially, the law was defended as emancipating women from an oppressive, 
patriarchal Islam. Furthermore, even though about 81 percent of Muslim women in France never 
wore a headscarf out of the house, the law can be interpreted in a larger framework of limits on 
religious and cultural rights. Thomas claims that the law was not conceived in hopes of cracking 
down on possible terrorists, but instead was in response to Islamic fundamentalism. The more 
recent law of April 2011, banning the burka or niqab face covering, was defended for the same 
reasons: women’s rights, facilitating better integration and the combatting fundamentalism.41 To 
Muslims, however, it is easy to see how such a law could be considered as restrictive of religious 
rights and could incite anger against France, regardless of whether one chooses to veil or not. 
Thomas claims that it is neither the extremely devout Muslims nor the non-practicing Muslims 
who react vehemently to restrictions on cultural rights. Instead, “Still in question are many 
moderate Muslims who are not particularly committed to wearing headscarves themselves but 
who may see France’s latest “scarf hunt” and more recent attacks on the burqa or niqab as 
evidence of a certain public, officially sanctioned, “islamophobia.”42 Further, Claude Moniquet 
claimed that for most Muslims in France, these cultural laws are not considered oppressive. “I 
think for most of the Muslims it is not a big deal [wearing the burka]. Clearly for extremists, 
Islamists it is a big deal but anything would be a big deal. They would just seize any opportunity 
to say that they are oppressed, Muslims are oppressed and so on.” He affirmed that the 
protestation of the laws is thus simply an affirmation of radicalization.  
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The Banlieue 
 
In addition to the government policies that accompany integration, another major aspect 
of the French model is that which is visible – the places where disadvantaged Muslim 
immigrants once settled and still live today. In French, these ghettos are called banlieues, but 
they represent much more than impoverished areas as their literal translation might suggest. 
Recently, French scholar Gilles Kepel – in conjunction with French think tank Institut Montaigne 
– published a study called “Banlieue de la Republique” (2011). His introduction states, “Islam 
plays an important role, entangled with other issues – the city, education, employment, security, 
politics and religion. All of this forms the very notion of “banlieue” in the common usage of 
contemporary French.”43 This highlights a very important distinction: that even the word 
banlieue has negative connotations and is thus highly stigmatized in France today.  
 
Kiran Grewal elaborates this concept, arguing that the banlieue is used “as an indirect 
means of discussing ethnicity and national identity” and as an “opportunity for France to attempt 
to reinforce its particular founding national myths,” where “France’s problematic relationship 
with Islam is played out.”44 Grewal claims that it was in 1981 that French discourse on the 
banlieue became particularly problematic. Since then, the banlieue has been represented as home 
to the “dangerous classes” – mainly constituted by “foreigners,” Muslims and Arabs, – who are 
well on their way to organized crime and terrorism.45 Further, Grewal illustrates that the word 
“banlieue” is conflated with Islam and Islamic fundamentalism; during the 2005 banlieue riots in 
France, Muslim leaders were automatically and without question asked to quell the violence, 
even though the rioters had no apparent adherence to Islam. These amalgamations lead to a 
misunderstanding of integration problems in banlieues. If the French perceive banlieues as 
terrorist enclaves, it is easy to blame integration problems on incompatibility of banlieue (read: 
Muslim) values with Republican values. Overall, however, the Republic needs the banlieue 
because through it, France can reinforce her founding myths “upon which dominant hegemonic 
identity is built.”46  
 
Claude Moniquet expressed grave concern over the question of banlieues today; “we let 
this social tragedy develop in the suburbs for thirty years,” he explained. He referenced specific 
lawless areas across the country where even police forces are afraid to enter for fear of violence. 
He believes that two to three generations have lived in destitute banlieue conditions, which may 
have facilitated radicalization. Concerning the future of these enclaves he claimed, “I am 
afraid.”47 
 
This isn’t to say that Muslims in France never succeed, as illustrated by the documentary 
Voyage en Beurgoisie. The documentary highlights various “beurs” and through their stories 
demonstrates the emergence of a middle class of French citizens of immigrant origin against the 
backdrop of a discriminatory education system. One recurring theme in the film was family 
encouragement to stay in school. For many of those interviewed, it was their parents who 
encouraged education when their children began to stray in their teenage years. This brings out 
an important individual factor of the Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law paper 
in particular: the influence of family dynamics. The paper cites that complicated childhoods can 
be personal experiences that shape an individual’s vulnerability to radicalization. Although the 
examples in Voyage en Beurgoisie relate only to education, a supportive family structure is 
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important for success in all aspects of life. When this structure is absent, it can be filled by the 
solidarity and identity offered by a group of radicals or terrorists. This idea will be particularly 
important in the following case study of Mohamed Merah.  
 
The Scooter Killer – Mohamed Merah 
 
Early Life 
 
Mohamed Merah, a French citizen of Algerian descent, committed the worst terrorist 
attack in France in the last decade – killing seven people including three French paratroopers, 
three Jewish children and a rabbi between March 11 and 19, 2012 in French towns of Toulouse 
and Montauban.48 Merah had a troubled childhood characterized by anti-Semitic influences and 
familial violence.49 His parents, who moved from Algeria to a banlieue called Les Izards before 
Merah was born, separated when he was four. Merah’s father supposedly beat Merah’s older 
brothers – Abdelkader and Abdelghani – but didn’t abuse Mohamed as frequently because of his 
small size.50 After Merah’s parents’ split, his father was jailed for drug trafficking.51 In search of 
a father figure, Merah turned to his older brother Abdelkader. Kader was known for violence; he 
would frequently insult his mother, beat his sister, Souad Merah, and was eventually jailed in 
2003 for four years after stabbing his brother Abdelghani. Abdelghani Merah, in a tell-all 
documentary released in France last year, claimed that, “we [the Merah family] solved our 
problems with violence.” This documentary was released prior to Abdelghani’s book, “My 
Brother, That Terrorist.” Both the book and the documentary denounced his family’s penchant 
for violence and Salafism. 
 
Mohamed Merah, like his brother Kader, was prone to angry outbursts and also abused 
his mother. He was placed in a care facility at age eight and, despite her promises, Merah’s 
mother never came to visit on weekends, leading to a great sense of neglect and abandonment in 
young Merah.52 In his early teenage years, a teacher who was interviewed for the documentary 
described Mohamed as unstable but intelligent. His report card from the academic year 2000-
2001 noted an unacceptable number of absences and violence towards his classmates; Merah was 
eventually expelled for these reasons in 2003. It was at this time that he became involved in 
delinquent activities, including the trafficking of cocaine. According to a former friend 
interviewed in the documentary, Merah enjoyed the adrenaline rush from stealing cars, items 
from houses and shops.53 
 
Radicalization Process 
 
 It is believed that Mohamed Merah radicalized after serving a 20-month stint in prison in 
2007 for stealing a purse.54 In the documentary, Abdelghani explained that it was following his 
release from prison that Mohamed began saying things like, “I will get my revenge on France.”55 
During this time in prison, Merah also allegedly began reading the Koran according to 
conversations with police during the standoff that ultimately led to his death.56 There are also 
rumors that Merah became acquainted with Forsane Alizza, a supposed jihadist group, during his 
time in prison.57 After prison, Merah attempted to join the French army and the Foreign Legion 
but was rejected from both because of his delinquent record. In 2010, he traveled to Turkey, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Afghanistan, and spent two months in Pakistan in 2011 “to 
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look for real brothers” according to his brother, Abdelghani.58 In Pakistan, he claimed he trained 
with an Al Qaeda operative, but French intelligence services have been unable to corroborate this 
statement.59 This travel raised red flags for French officials and in November 2011, intelligence 
officials questioned Merah about his travels. He provided photos claiming he was simply visiting 
as a tourist.60 The documentary found among these photos, however, other photos of Merah 
wielding a large knife with what has been presumed to be a fellow jihadist.61 While this piece of 
evidence may suggest that he received training in Pakistan, the French government, including the 
Interior Minister at the time, Claude Guéant, has asserted that they do not believe Merah 
explicitly visited camps during his travels.62 
 
The extent to which Merah consulted with others during his radicalization process is 
disputed based on lack of information and mistrust of Merah’s own statements. The debate 
surrounds whether or not Merah frequented a mosque in Toulouse during his radicalization and 
to what extent his family aided him in preparation for his attacks. Many news articles claim that 
Merah belonged to no mosque, but the documentary suggests that he frequented a mosque in 
Toulouse with other Salafists and, although the imam there was not extremist, Merah’s visits 
served as “indoctrination sessions.”63 The documentary also secretly interviewed interactions 
with Olivier Corel, who is considered to have been Merah’s spiritual adviser. Corel is known as 
the “white Emir”, and was investigated in 2007 for alleged recruitment of a group of jihadists 
south of Toulouse who were seeking to fight in Iraq; despite the accusations, Corel was never 
charged.64 Abdelghani claimed that Merah frequently solicited advice from Corel, but the extent 
of Corel’s guidance in regards to Merah’s attacks is unknown. Clarification on this piece of 
evidence would be key in determining Merah’s status as a lone wolf.  
 
Abdelkader, Merah’s violent older brother, is also suspected to have helped in the 
radicalization process of Mohamed, especially as Kader was considered a neighborhood 
proselytizer known for converting others to radical Islam. The documentary shows a video clip 
of the Merah family in the hospital when a family member fell ill, and uses the footage of Kader 
and Mohamed joking together as evidence of Kader’s “complicity” in Merah’s radicalization.65 
While this particular causation seems cursory, it is hard to ignore Kader’s influence on Merah’s 
childhood. Kader’s role in the attacks has yet to be substantiated, yet he has been in custody 
since March of 2012.  
 
In addition to Abdelkader, it is important to acknowledge the role of Souad, Merah’s 
sister, once a “modern” Muslim who later radicalized and began wearing a hijab covering her 
entire body. A friend of the Merah family was interviewed in the documentary and said that of 
the three siblings, Kader was the most radicalized, Souad occupied the middle space and 
Mohamed was the least radical. The documentary secretly filmed Souad conversing with 
Abdelghani, and captures her defending Mohamed’s attacks and clearly demonstrating the extent 
of her radical beliefs and hatred of France. Souad also admits that she had knowledge of Merah’s 
travels abroad (Abdelghani claims his siblings kept such information from him, telling him 
Mohamed was in Algeria). Importantly, Souad claimed that Mohamed committed the attacks 
without a leader, though she may have been saying this to protect herself and her brother 
Kader.66 Since the release of the documentary, Souad has been investigated by French authorities 
but not charged.67 
 
34 Boyle !
As this case relates to use of technology and the Internet, it is believed that Merah 
consulted Internet sources, including the “Global Encyclopedia of Security.”68 One news source 
claimed that Merah spent months watching videos on the Internet.69 Claude Moniquet, a source 
inside the intelligence community, concurs that Merah is known to have consulted Internet 
sites.70 There is no knowledge of whether or not Merah participated actively in an online 
community, but it is well known that he enjoyed violent video games and movies. In the virtual 
world of video games is where Merah could have found a “replacement social environment”, but 
the connection between video games and radicalization is beyond the scope of this paper and a 
topic for future research. Furthermore, regardless of whether or not he interacted online in 
forums, Merah used the Internet to seek out his first victim: a paratrooper who listed a 
motorcycle for sale. Merah expressed a feigned interest in the bike, set up a meeting with the 
paratrooper and shot him at point blank range at the arranged meeting site. Merah’s knowledge 
of technology was further demonstrated by his use of a GoPro action camera to film his attacks, 
as well as his apparent disregard for security camera monitoring of his actions. The attacks were 
supposedly posted online, but they have not been found since. 71  
 
Surveillance and Attacks 
 
Based on previous delinquency – including 18 minor crimes, some involving violence – 
and travels to suspicious countries, France began surveillance on Merah in 2009.72 Between 
September 1, 2010 and February 20, 2011, the Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence 
(DCRI) monitored the mobile phone Merah used, which was supposedly his mother’s.73 During 
this time he made 186 calls to contacts in 20 different countries. While monitoring Mohamed 
Merah, the DCRI also monitored his brother Abdelkader and sister Souad because of their 
alleged ties to a Salafist movement.74  
 
On March 11, Merah took his first victim: a French paratrooper. Four days later, he killed 
two more paratroopers. All three were of North African origin and had recently returned from 
Afghanistan.75 On March 19, he approached a Jewish school in Toulouse and killed a rabbi and 
three Jewish schoolchildren.76 He fled the scene of each killing on a scooter, leading to the 
nickname “the scooter killer.” French police zeroed in on Merah after tracing the IP address of 
his mother’s computer, with which Merah planned a meet up with his first victim concerning a 
scooter for sale.77After tracing the IP address, an armed group of police surrounded Merah’s 
apartment block on March 21. Shortly after French police surrounded his home, a man claiming 
to be Merah called a French television channel to explain his justification for the attacks. He 
cited three specific grievances: the ban on the full Islamic veil, France’s participation in the war 
in Afghanistan and to avenge the deaths of Palestinian children killed by Israel.78 Following a 
32-hour siege overnight between March 21 and 22, 2012, Merah was killed in a five-minute 
firefight with police.  
 
Despite the fact that he was killed, recordings between him, a police negotiator and 
intelligence officer during the siege provide a look into his psyche and rationale.79 In the summer 
of 2012, the confidential recordings were leaked on television, causing a huge controversy but 
providing valuable information for scholars studying this case. During the siege, Merah claimed 
he acted alone and although his contacts in Waziristan suggested he should attack in Canada or 
the United States, he refused and continued on by himself. He also stated that he received no 
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help from his older brother, Abdelkader, citing a long history of familial issues and sibling 
rivalry. He said, “My objective was to attack alone…in order to be entirely anonymous.”80 A 
video namelessly sent to Al Jazeera, postmarked on March 21, showed the video footage of 
Merah’s attacks. The video was titled “Al Qaeda attacks France” and the footage was expertly 
edited, including background music between events. Although the video claims the attacks were 
affiliated with Al Qaeda, experts aren’t so sure due to a letter in French sent along with the 
video; Al Qaeda typically releases statements in Arabic.81 Given that the video was postmarked 
on the same day as the siege on Merah’s apartment, it is unclear whether Merah or an accomplice 
sent the video. Al Jazeera ultimately decided not to broadcast the video for respect of the 
victim’s families and fear of further glorification of the attacks. In the same vein, France 
requested that Facebook remove a page dedicated to honoring the scooter killer.82 
 
There is currently only one person being held in connection with the attack – Merah’s 
older brother Abdelkader who has been in custody since last year. Just recently, in March 2013, 
three people including a serving French soldier were arrested in connection with the attack.83 
They have not been charged and French officials have yet to provide context around their arrest. 
 
Limitations to Analysis 
 
 The case study of Mohamed Merah is complicated for many reasons. The first is that my 
primary resource is a documentary released in order to promote Abdelghani Merah’s book My 
Brother, That Terrorist. There were obviously many motivations behind the documentary, not 
least of which may have been personal revenge against the Merah family. Because of this, some 
of the information could be exaggerated for dramatic effect. Furthermore, some of the news 
sources presented varying accounts of Merah’s childhood and because there has yet to have been 
a case study on him, there is no universal academic resource from which to draw accurate 
information. It is thus important to declare that the analysis of Merah’s case carries varying 
degrees of certainty based on the amount of knowledge concerning each aspect.  
 
In addition to the informational limitations, French officials and terrorism scholars 
themselves are undecided over whether or not Merah was indeed a lone wolf. Bernard Squarcini, 
the former chief of the DCRI said Merah “radicalized alone” and that he “didn’t belong to a 
single network.”84 The French Interior Minister at the time, Claude Guéant, originally claimed 
that Merah was a part of a group of 15 individuals who ascribed to Salafist ideology.85 However, 
a more recent article from March 2013 states, “detectives are convinced” that Merah had 
accomplices.86 Many observers wonder how Merah was able to amass firearms (including three 
Colt .45s, a Sten submachine gun and a shotgun) and $26,000 in cash without outside help. 
Philippe Migaux (2012), a French terrorism scholar, claimed that he acquired these firearms 
“with other delinquents from the suburb.”87 On the other hand, these weapons are signals of 
amateur work, as sophisticated groups tend to work with explosives or weapons needing the 
same type of ammunition. 88  Olivier Roy, Professor of Political Science at the European 
University Institute in Florence called Merah “a loner and a loser” who didn’t belong to any 
religious congregation, radical group or local Islamic movement.89  
 
Another large constraint for this analysis is the contradictory information concerning 
Merah’s involvement with Al Qaeda. There has been much talk about the role of Al Qaeda in 
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Merah’s radicalization, as he specifically claimed membership in the group. The Daily Beast 
pointed out in an article that even if Merah wasn’t specifically a member (as French intelligence 
services have determined) he was nonetheless following directives given by the late Osama bin 
Laden and later, by Ayman al-Zawahiri.90 In 2010, in an audiotape aired on Al Jazeera, bin 
Laden disseminated the first message specifically targeting France – mentioning the burka ban of 
2011 and France’s continued military involvement in Afghanistan.91  These remarks were 
repeated almost verbatim in Merah’s justification for his own attacks. Moreover, noted terrorism 
scholar Bruce Hoffman said, “Even if [Merah] isn’t directly part of the al Qaeda firmament, it 
may not matter because for Zawahiri looking at the news, he’s thinking ‘They are listening to me 
vicariously, and this strategy works.’”92 Similarly, indicating the inspirational power of Al 
Qaeda’s ideology, Roy noted, “Merah found in Al Qaeda a narrative of solitary heroism.”93 
Claude Moniquet placed Merah “somewhere in the middle” or “a lone wolf with friends” 
because his supposed contacts with Al Qaeda voided his status as a lone wolf, yet he carried out 
his actions alone.94 
 
A final complication faced in this analysis is Merah’s own statements, which cannot be 
corroborated. For example, he said in the standoff with police that he attended training camps 
and is a member of Al Qaeda. While an affiliate of Al Qaeda apparently later praised Merah’s 
actions, nobody from the group ever corroborated his membership. Furthermore, government 
officials have declared that Merah never did visit training camps, even though photos from his 
travels indicate some sort of violent, radical behavior. Regardless of these limitations, what 
follows is an attempt to categorize Merah as either a lone wolf or a lone actor, according to my 
own definitions.  
 
Analysis – Was Merah a Lone Wolf? 
 
Mohamed Merah’s narrative resonates with the factors described above his case study: 
integration, identity, laicité and the banlieue. The salience of these factors can be corroborated, 
and thus I have a high degree of certainty that they were influential in Merah’s radicalization. It 
is evident that Merah’s family was poorly integrated given the radical nature of the father and 
majority of the children. 95 As a second-generation immigrant, Merah likely struggled with his 
composite French Muslim identity. Eventual rejection by France (evidenced by his inability to 
join the army or French legion), led to an insistence on the radical Muslim aspect of his identity 
over the French aspect. Moreover, Merah invoked the French principle of laicité in his standoff 
with the police and his phone call to a French television station when he claimed that his attacks 
were in part to seek revenge against France for the burka ban. As with many immigrants, the 
Merah family’s location in a disadvantaged banlieue limited Merah’s schooling options (as laws 
mandate children attend school in the geographic location of their home) and surrounded him in 
an environment of delinquency, drugs and radicalism. As the radicalization literature states, level 
of education is not a good indicator of terrorism. However, in Merah’s case, when he dropped 
out of school he became more involved in petty delinquency, which eventually led to larger 
crimes. An argument can be made, then, that education as proof of intellect is not a determining 
factor, but education as a tool to occupy disadvantaged youth with dismal future prospects may 
be an interesting root cause to pursue in the future. 
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Perhaps the most easily corroborated factor contributing to Merah’s radicalization was 
his family situation. The lack of family support – a factor considered by the TTSRL paper – 
facilitated a downward spiral from an early age. His proclivity for violence and Salafism was 
directly derived from his violent childhood. But even this seemingly lucid factor is clouded. It is 
unknown, for example, whether or not family members helped him procure the materials for his 
attacks, or had knowledge about the attacks ahead of time. The documentary targets Abdelkader 
for his role in Merah’s radicalization, but it is difficult to trust such a one-sided source, so the 
degree of certainty concerning Kader’s specific role is somewhat low. 
 
 If this analysis was based on Merah’s own statements, he would automatically be 
disqualified for lone wolf status given his claim that he trained with an Al Qaeda operative in 
Pakistan in 2011. However, because Al Qaeda didn’t claim responsibility for the attack (thus not 
corroborating Merah’s statement that he was a member of the organization), I don’t believe this 
analysis can assume that any of his statements are valid. Therefore, while he most likely traveled 
abroad to meet fellow militants, I will categorize these visits as indoctrination rather than 
training. This indoctrination is obviously a supplement to that which he received growing up in 
an anti-Semitic, Salafist family. Unlike Merah’s own statements, it is more likely that 
Abdelghani Merah’s statements about the Merah family are indeed true because the French 
social welfare services and Abdelkader’s own criminal records substantiated Abdelghani’s 
assertions. Thus, assuming Abdelghani’s statements to be accurate, it is clear that Merah was 
subjected to radical beliefs from his childhood onward. In the absence of his father, Merah 
looked to older brother Kader. In such a mentor situation, it is easy to imagine that Merah was 
attracted to radical Islam simply because Kader ascribed to similar beliefs. This would be the 
most benign association between the two one could assume. It is also possible that Kader and 
Merah were more directly involved in the lead up to the attacks, as French officials suspect. 
However, family indoctrination still does not compromise Merah’s status as a lone wolf.  
 
 The role of Olivier Corel is interesting because the documentary did not specify whether 
Merah requested the advice of Corel, or whether he was pressured to radicalize by Corel. This 
factor certainly walks the line between indoctrination and training. While Abdelghani claimed 
that Merah consulted with Corel on pretty much everything, it is unclear whether or not Corel 
actively recruited Merah or Merah continuously sought out the help of Corel. This fact is 
important in determining whether or not this was indoctrination (passive) or training (active) 
engagement with the authority figure (Corel). It is useful here to set up contingencies: if Merah 
pursued Corel, it would be considered active engagement; if Corel pursued Merah as a subject to 
be radicalized, this would constitute passive indoctrination on Merah’s part. Regardless, we can 
argue that Merah had at least some repeated social interaction with this man. The nature of this 
interaction cannot be determined, but if known would have implications for a more accurate 
categorization of Merah a lone wolf or a lone actor. 
 
 Merah’s use of technology and the Internet, while very savvy and innovative, does not 
constitute active consumption. While it is known that he consulted Internet sites and 
communicated with one of his victims online, it is unknown whether or not he participated in 
chat rooms or forums, which would have qualified him as a lone actor according to my 
terminology. Instead, his Internet action fits with my profile of a lone wolf. An important note 
when discussing use of the Internet was Merah’s revolutionary use of a Craigslist-like website to 
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facilitate a meeting with his victim. Masquerading as a potential buyer for the victim’s 
motorcycle, Merah was able to gain a face-to-face opportunity for attack. This is simply an 
interesting facet of the case, and does not have any implications for Merah’s status as a lone 
wolf.  
 
 Ultimately, this paper concludes that Merah was indeed a lone wolf following my own 
definition. However, it is clear that certain contingencies exist based on lack of information. For 
example, Merah’s supposed training abroad has yet to be substantiated. Given the recent nature 
of his travels, if French intelligence services indeed found him to have trained abroad, his status 
as a lone wolf would be immediately compromised. Moreover, the role of Olivier Corel and 
Abdelkader Merah both in the planning and facilitation of these attacks remains unclear. If one 
or both of these individuals trained Merah or helped in the planning of the attacks, Merah would 
be labeled as a lone actor but not as a lone wolf. It is unknown whether or not Abdelkader has 
given up any information during his time in custody, but certainly the information he possibly 
holds could be vital to definitively making this distinction.  
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Conclusion  
Conclusion – Findings 
 
This paper finds that the influence of the Internet has contaminated the traditional idea of 
a pure lone wolf, and thus multiple concepts must be demarcated to address the behavior of 
various lone individuals. I redefined the terms “lone wolf” and “lone actor” to achieve this aim. 
Accordingly, the case study of Mohamed Merah was ultimately deemed a lone wolf case, albeit 
with a lower degree of certainty given lack of information. Moreover, despite the inherent 
solitary nature of lone wolves and lone actors, the degree of social interaction still required for 
radicalization was surprising. This indicates that it is still difficult for an individual to completely 
radicalize in his or her basement using only a computer. Nonetheless, the potential for such self-
radicalization exists and this research thus presents important implications for theory and policy. 
First, I will discuss the limitations on this research and suggestions for future research, including 
parallels between the Merah case and the recent Boston marathon bombings. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 Limitations to this research abound in the case study section, most of which stem from a 
lack of information or abundance of misinformation concerning Mohamed Merah. My primary 
source for the case study was a documentary that clearly contained motivations of revenge 
against the Merah family. An objective academic study of Merah’s background and childhood is 
thus crucial to determining what factors were salient in his radicalization, and such a study is my 
first recommendation for further research. Furthermore, it seems pertinent in the European and 
French context to study negative identification as a result of group rejections. Mohamed Merah 
felt largely marginalized and rejected by the French and thus isolated from the French identity. It 
may be useful to apply Ramon Spaaij’s idea of ideological movement identification to the 
question of national identity to determine what the ramifications are of an individual feeling a 
negative identification to an entire country. In addition, as mentioned in the above case study, the 
link between education and terrorism should be re-examined. While it is clear that terrorists have 
disparate levels of education, the idea of education as an alternative to delinquency (as we see in 
the Merah case) is an important counter-radicalization measure and should be further explored. 
Moreover, Merah’s obsession with violent video games suggests that in addition to the Internet, 
gaming can influence individuals. The link between video games and radicalization is an 
additional recommendation for further research. 
 
Boston Marathon Bombings 
 
 The final major avenue for future research concerns the parallels between the Merah case 
study and the still-developing case of the Boston marathon bombings on April 15, 2013. It is first 
important to note that these brothers are not homegrown terrorists because they were not born in 
the United States; however, they cannot be considered complete foreigners either because 
estimates at the time of this writing suggest they have lived in the U.S. for approximately a 
decade. As of this writing (April 25, 2013), investigators are still gathering information about the 
brothers’ radicalization process; it is still unclear whether or not they had outside support from a 
group or radical individual who indoctrinated them into radical Islam. Nonetheless, investigators 
are focusing on some of the same key points from the Merah case: the motivations of the 
brothers, the influence of the older brother Tamerlan over the younger brother Dzhokhar, 
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Tamerlan’s travel abroad and efficiency of the American counterterrorism system and use of the 
Internet to self-radicalize. I will explore each of these briefly below.  
 
 First, Dzhokhar explained in some of his early interrogations that he and his brother were 
motivated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is an oft-cited motivation for Muslim 
terrorists, and indeed is similar to Merah’s claim that his attack was in part revenge against 
France for participating in the war in Afghanistan. This touches the idea of the ummah or 
transnational community of Muslims. It is possible that the Tsarnaev brothers felt “moral 
outrage” (Marc Sageman’s term) or “strong reciprocity” (Sophia Moskalenko Clark McCauley’s 
term) and wanted to avenge the wrongdoings experienced by fellow Muslims as a result of U.S. 
wars. This has ramifications for the foreign policy of the United States because it clearly 
demonstrates how foreign policy interventions create grievances, which in turn fuel attacks on 
U.S. soil or against U.S. interests. 
 
Second, the Boston case suggests implications for the influence of family dynamics on 
indoctrination. In this case, it is currently assumed that Dzhokhar was under the influence of the 
more-radical Tamerlan, yet they committed the acts together therefore disqualifying them as lone 
wolves. Currently, the media and investigators are trying to figure out whether or not there was a 
third-party individual or group who provided training, inspiration or tactical help. One recent 
development has been the influence of the mother, who was once overheard discussing jihad by 
Russian surveillance. However, because we are considering two people – one assumed to have 
been more radical than the other – it could be claimed that in fact that third party was subsumed 
by Tamerlan himself and he served to encourage and motivate Dzhokhar. Using research from 
the first and third sections of this paper, self-radicalization often still requires the reinforcement 
by another individual for confidence or spiritual sanctioning in certain phases of radicalization. 
What has not yet been explored in the scholarship is whether or not this outside contact is 
necessary when dealing with one individual who is highly radicalized and one who is less 
radicalized but under the influence of the first. This family association, not only between 
brothers but under potential influence of the mother as well, lends further significance to my 
discussion of family dynamics in the Merah case study. 
 
Third, investigators are particularly concerned by Tamerlan’s six-month trip to Dagestan 
and Chechnya in 2012 where it is believed he may have further radicalized. This trip is similar in 
nature to Mohamed Merah’s travel abroad, because the FBI had been tipped off by Russia that 
Tamerlan “had changed drastically since 2010” and was traveling to Russia “to join unspecified 
underground groups.”1 This was one of four separate contacts between Russian spy services and 
the American counterterrorism bureaucracy (including the FBI and CIA) prior to Tamerlan’s 
departure. The FBI questioned Tamerlan and his family in 2011 and concluded that they could 
not find connections to extremists; the case was closed without further questioning, just like the 
case of Merah.  
 
Fourth and finally, the brothers’ use of the Internet is currently being scrutinized. 
Because the investigation is in the early stages, their public social media profiles are of the most 
interest, as opposed to their actions on terrorist websites. It is known that they consulted the 
English online magazine Inspire produced by an Al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen. This magazine is 
well known for its detailed instructions on how to make homemade bombs.2 A news analysis 
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piece in the New York Times looked at Dzhokhar’s Twitter account and his profile page on 
VKontakte, a Russian social-networking site.3 For the most part, his activity online was what 
could be expected of a teenaged boy – though some posts suggested anti-Americanism and 
Islamic fundamentalism. Tamerlan’s YouTube account and suspected Amazon.com “wish list” 
were targeted in this particular news analysis, but it is difficult to draw concrete links between 
information consulted online and actual beliefs. The analysis of the brothers’ posts suggested 
both the unique use of social media for understanding an individual, but also the pitfalls of over-
analyzing the data and trying to forge links that may or may not actually exist.  
 
Implications for Theory 
  
This research shows that lone wolf theories are more precise when they take into account 
the influence of the Internet and specify how Internet usage affects an individual’s status as a 
lone wolf. It is clear that when talking about terrorists who act alone, at least two terms should be 
defined to address the breadth of their activities – as I do in my section on lone wolf theory. My 
two definitions – lone wolf and lone actor – aspire to address the spectrum of lone terrorists that 
exist. For example, an individual can carry out a terrorist attack alone without actually fully 
acting alone. More precise definitions allow law enforcement officials and scholars to more 
accurately define these individuals and their paths to terrorism. That being said, it is important to 
note that my terms were only defined in the above section – causation was not established. 
Further exploration is necessary to develop a theory surrounding these defined terms. 
 
Implications for Policy 
 
This paper presents certain policy implications for intelligence surveillance and 
counterterrorism policy. First, intelligence communities face privacy boundaries in monitoring 
the Internet. Furthermore, new media is not yet considered a legitimate source of intelligence; 
this is particularly evidenced by the developing Tsarnaev case.4 It is important, however, to 
monitor users of extremist websites – especially those who are particularly active in online 
communities and forums. Though privacy should always be a core value in a democratic society, 
there are times when surveillance is necessary for the security of the country. Second, 
surveillance should be improved offline as well. As evidenced by both Merah’s case and that of 
the Boston bombers, better efforts must be made to share information between security services 
on a domestic and international level. Leads on potential radical individuals need to be more 
aggressively pursued, as evidenced by the inability of both the French intelligence service and 
the FBI to detect, even after questioning, Mohamed Merah and Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s respective 
radical tendencies.   
 
Third, as mentioned above, Western countries must emphasize sensible foreign and 
domestic policies. In the French case, Mohamed Merah attacked based on both domestic and 
international policy grievances. His disadvantaged status was certainly heightened based on a 
perceived rejection by the French white majority, and his life of poverty, violence and crime in a 
disadvantaged banlieue. French domestic policy must be reformed in order to give individuals of 
immigrant descent a more equal chance at success; in addition, cultural laws should be sensitive 
to the fact that under the umbrella of French nationality, pluralities of sub-identities exist that 
may or may not be more important than the national identity. Particularly, a greater effort should 
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be made in the media to avoid stigmatizing Islam, or equating Islam with terrorism. Furthermore, 
foreign policy is also important, especially in light of Merah and Dzhokhar’s statements 
concerning the war in Afghanistan. It is difficult, however, to temper foreign policy for fear of 
angering a small sect of “macro-nationalist” individuals who may avenge perceived wrongs 
committed against their Muslim brothers. Foreign policies thus should emphasize their goals 
explicitly and specify why such policies are not an attack on the global Muslim community. Such 
statements can help counter grievances felt as a result of Western foreign policies.  
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